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 Thesis Abstract 
 
Once one of the richest countries in Southeast Asia, Myanmar has suffered the effects of a closed 
economy for over 50 years to become one of the poorest and most corrupt countries in the world. 
Though excited international investors wait to exploit Myanmar’s large labor force and natural 
resources as it reopens its markets, the country is currently far behind its potential. In such a 
small economy, large FDI inflows would have a significant impact on the country’s path going 
forward. Whether or not it receives these inflows depends on how multinational enterprises view 
Myanmar’s investment environment. In particular, it’s recently enacted foreign investment law 
as well as the status of sanctions on the country. By looking at a cross-section of ASEAN-
member countries from the period 1995-2011, this thesis studies the effect of foreign investment 
policies on FDI flows using a fixed-effects regression.  
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“This is Burma, and it will be quite unlike any land you know about.” 
- Rudyard Kipling, 1899 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Myanmar 
In the early 19
th
 century, Britain saw potential in a small Southeast Asian nation and by the 
end of the third Anglo-Burmese war in 1885, Burma had been engulfed by the British Empire. 
Britain immediately began to exploit the small Southeast Asian country’s vast natural resources. 
However, by the middle of the 20
th
 century, a heavy-handed British rule drove Burma into 
numerous protests and rebellions leading to its independence from Britain in 1948. Though 
Burma continued to grow economically from 1948 through 1962, political instability under its 
transitioning democratic government led to conflict and opposition. Not long thereafter, 
instability originating from varying political and religious views drove General Ne Win to 
exercise a coup d’état in 1962 ousting the prime minister. Military General Ne Win’s initiation of 
“The Burmese Way to Socialism” marked the beginning of Burma’s socialist regime. With this 
 2 
transition, Ne Win nationalized the economy and formed a single-party socialist government 
under military control.  
Before the socialist takeover, Myanmar
1
 had become one of the richest countries in Southeast 
Asia amidst the political unrest (Groff). Prior to 1962, Myanmar and Thailand, two bordering 
countries, had similar sized populations and levels of GDP. In the following 50 years, their 
populations grew at similar rates while Thailand’s economy grew to over five times the size of 
Myanmar’s (Worldbank.org). The lack of growth in Myanmar can be seen through its low GDP 
per capita of just US$875.1 (ASEAN.org), and in real-world terms, its peoples’ extremely poor 
quality of life. Rich in natural resources and favorably located in the Bay of Bengal, one of 
Asia’s major shipping regions, Myanmar had much potential. It even became a world leader in 
rice exports signifying its importance in regional agriculture. Yet, 50 years under the rule of its 
ruthless military junta brought Myanmar’s progress to a standstill and it quickly fell behind its 
neighbors. To this day, Myanmar still appears to be stuck in the 1960s and is known globally as 
one of today’s least developed countries.  
2010 marked Myanmar’s initial steps towards its first civilian government since 1962. 
Among numerous changes, the country elected new members of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (Union 
of the Republic of Myanmar) on November 7
th
 2010 and enacted a new constitution only a year 
later.
2
 With hopes of encouraging this momentum, many countries have either waved or given 
extensions on debts owed to them by Myanmar. Additionally, many non-governmental and 
intergovernmental organizations have promised financial assistance during Myanmar’s 
                                                        
1 Note: Since 1989 the Burmese military and parliament have promoted the name 
Myanmar; the US Government has not adopted the name, which is a derivative of the 
Burmese short-form name Myanma Naingngandaw (www.cia.gov). 
2 This election would be the country’s first since 1990 and first to include civilians such as the 
leader of the opposition party Aung Sang Suu Kyi that was not conducted in a corrupt manner. 
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transition. For instance, the World Bank and the Asia Development Bank have either announced 
plans to, or have already provided grants to Myanmar that intend to help the country repay debts 
or develop its infrastructure (worldbank.org). Even President Barack Obama, alongside Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton, spoke at the University of Yangon in November of 2012 after 
suspending a large portion of US economic sanctions just months earlier. As the first American 
President to set foot on Burmese soil, President Obama attempted to inspire the citizens of 
Myanmar in hopes of encouraging them further down a path of change (CNN.com).  
Though the sustainability of these reforms remains in question by the country’s international 
audience, the country has still received significant attention from abroad. Multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) and individual investors alike believe the country has substantial opportunity 
as its economy begins to open up to the world and the world begins to accept it as a transitioning 
nation. In addition to Myanmar’s many attractive qualities for investors, two of Myanmar’s five 
bordering countries, China and India, contain the two largest and fastest growing populations in 
the world (CIA.gov). Renowned investor Jim Rogers famously said at a Conference in Singapore 
in early 2012, “If I could put all of my money into Myanmar, I would.” Even large corporations 
such as Coca-Cola and General Electric have shown interest in investing in the country. In 
March of this year, Coca Cola made its first shipment to Myanmar in over sixty years. Until then, 
it was just one of a few countries globally where the company had not sold its products 
(http://www.coca-colacompany.com/press-center).  
Attraction of foreign investors can be explained through John Dunning’s OLI framework 
(also known as the Eclectic Paradigm) in which he argues that firms look for three components 
in a host country. Assuming the presence of these incentives – which are Ownership, Location, 
and Internalization (this framework described in greater detail in the next section.) – Myanmar’s 
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success in further securing capital most likely depends upon two specific factors. One factor is 
the openness of its foreign investment laws and the government’s ability and transparency in 
enforcing these laws. The second factor is the status of international sanctions which similarly 
depend upon the status of the government but also on the status of ongoing ethnic and religious 
conflicts. These laws and sanctions, until only recently, changed on a daily basis.  
After ten months of strenuous negotiations between the government of Myanmar and its 
President, Thein Sein, they have designed a foreign investment policy that aims to attract 
investment from abroad while simultaneously protecting the interests of domestic firms. 
Frequent reports in the media attempting to predict the nature of the policy throughout this time 
was a sign of the policy’s importance to firms internationally. In designing the law, Myanmar’s 
government and President considered two main factors. Notably, the first factor is to protect the 
people and the economy of the host country. However, if a set of policies is geared too 
disproportionately toward domestic firms without benefits to foreign firms, the second factor, 
and debatably more important purpose of promoting investment from abroad would be 
unsuccessful. In this case, overly protectionist policies protect existing domestic producers but 
often at the cost of domestic consumers and workers. The key is to find the balance in a set of 
policies that successfully fulfills both parties’ interests consistently and transparently. 
Fortunately, Myanmar has had the ability to learn from fellow ASEAN member countries in their 
past experiences of attracting FDI. ASEAN member countries have benefitted greatly from FDI 
and their investment policies have evolved around this development. From a foundational 
standpoint, early drafts of Myanmar’s Investment Law appeared to be overly strict, causing 
distress among potential investors. However, with the push by President Thein Sein for greater 
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investment liberalization, the resulting law introduced this past November appears to be less 
strict than originally anticipated.  
Furthermore, the degree to which capital and knowledge reach the people of Myanmar could 
determine the success of a full transition to a democracy and open market economy, or at least 
keep Myanmar from reverting back to its old ways. Applying Dunning’s framework to the past 
experiences of fellow ASEAN member countries should indicate which policy changes have 
occurred that may have attracted or detracted from the desire to invest. This change in the 
investment environment represented through net changes in FDI flows. Myanmar has been 
presented with an incredible opportunity. Now known by many as the final frontier in Southeast 
Asia, international awareness could translate into capital that would significantly impact the 
growth of its underdeveloped economy. However, Myanmar must first prove to be a worthy 
destination of investment to attract capital and knowledge. By analyzing the institutional 
determinants of FDI flows to other ASEAN member countries, Myanmar should adjust its own 
policy according to the successes and failures of its neighbors.   
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The OLI Framework  
 In his framework known as the Eclectic Paradigm, or the OLI-Framework, John Dunning 
believes a host country must satisfy three basic fundamentals to attract FDI. They are Ownership, 
Location, and Internalization (Dunning 1981). This framework, developed in the early 1980s, 
provides a clear breakdown of the characteristics that MNEs theoretically look for when 
investing abroad. These components are affected by investment policies in various fashions, 
hence the importance of the broad yet clear picture they provide in understanding the incentives 
of MNEs. 
 The first component, ownership, refers to protection of the firm’s intangible assets such as 
rights to patents, trademarks and their own production processes. When investing abroad, 
especially in emerging markets where property rights are not always established or sufficiently 
enforced, most MNEs consider their ability to enforce ownership of specific technologies, 
techniques and other intangible assets exclusive to them. If a country does not satisfy this 
component, the MNE’s competitiveness would be driven lower as other firms, domestic and 
international; would gain access to these intangible assets thereby discouraging MNEs to invest 
by threatening profits and their competitive advantage more broadly. If this component is in 
place, on the other hand, a MNE would gain the competitive advantage. 
 The next part of his framework, locational advantages, refers to the advantages that are 
characteristic of the particular country and though not always direct, can still be affected by 
investment laws. Locational advantages generally refer to the proximity to developing markets in 
which an MNE can sell their products, access to natural resources, availability of low-cost labor 
and little to no tariffs and/or taxes. Referred to by Ramirez (2010), Michael Mortimore (2003) 
argues that the importance of some of these characteristics depends upon the nature of business 
in which the MNE operates. Many industries do not require all of these characteristics be 
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present. For instance, if a mining company is looking to invest abroad, it would first look for 
access to natural resources but perhaps the presence of a growing market in which to market its 
products is not necessary as it would look to sell their products in developed markets. 
Furthermore, though MNEs generally look for low-cost labor when investing in emerging 
markets, this qualification is not very specific and limits itself to only emerging markets. Rather, 
(again depending on the labor-intensity of the industry) MNE’s might consider the cost of labor 
per unit. A MNE should be willing to pay a price equivalent to the marginal return on labor. 
Lastly, the presence of special economic zones (SEZs) can often satisfy one or more of these 
advantages such as tax breaks and non-tariff barriers. 
 Dunning’s third factor is Internalization, essentially the advantages that pertain to why a 
company would want to make a direct investment or create a subsidiary in a host country rather 
than entering a joint venture with another firm. In doing so, as Ramirez (2010) describes, they 
undertake the costs of “research, development, production, and marketing,” but avoid costs of 
organizing new patents and licenses as well as avoid the distribution of their products through 
local businesses.  Furthermore, Ramirez (2010) refers to Spitaler (1971) and Markusen (1995) 
who argue that firms can more successfully protect their intangible assets such as licenses when 
held internally rather than by a domestic partner that could open their own operation and become 
a competitor.  
 While Dunning’s theoretical framework still strongly applies today, Ramirez (2010) points 
out that it may need to be updated or supplemented as it was developed over thirty years ago. As 
the world has become more financially interconnected since the early 1980’s, Dunning’s 
framework must be modified to incorporate this important new element. While fiscal policy 
appears to be accounted for through Dunning’s Locational and Internalization components, 
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Ramirez (2010) recognizes that monetary policy is not sufficiently represented in Dunning’s 
framework. As is common in developing economies, uncertainty stemming from inconsistent 
interest rates and exchange rates that have historically been manipulated or fixed rather than 
market-defined may also cause discomfort on the part of foreign investors. In this way, the 
general lack of private banking sectors outside of the state-owned banks in emerging markets 
could also turn away MNEs that cannot find funding from sources outside of the host country. 
 The application of this framework allows for a streamlined comparison of investment 
environments in ASEAN countries as well as makes the connection between the investment 
policies and the Index of Economic Freedom, the basis of the analysis on these investment 
policies, much more transparent.  
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Effect of Foreign Direct investment and Importance of Policies 
 
Adam Smith, in writing the Wealth of Nations over two hundred years ago, argued in favor of 
free and open markets. It is his theories on free markets, which the Index of Economic Freedom 
is based. Co-produced by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, the index is an 
annual report on economic freedom of countries around the world. The index finds year after 
year that the countries with the highest standard of living have generally been the most open 
economically (chart shown below). Many of the components on which the index is based are 
greatly impacted by the investment laws that the countries impose.  
Figure 1: Higher GDP per capita through higher economic freedom 
 
Source: The Heritage Foundation. Economic Freedom: Global and Regional Patterns 2013 
 
With this evidence, the logical question remains: why might countries design 
characteristically strict laws if general economic openness is becoming the global trend for 
improving living standards? Foreign investment can be related to economic, political and social 
development but it can also lead to corruption and economic distortion, by relation if not 
causation. Many years ago, economic theory would have strongly argued that FDI would always 
 $44,488  
 $35,228  
 $15,822  
 $5,475   $5,462  
 $-
 $20,000
 $40,000
 $60,000
Free Mostly Free Moderately
Free
Mostly Unfree Repressed
Higher GDP Per Capita through higher 
Economic Freedom 
GDP Per Capita
 12 
prove beneficial to host countries, that more capital should mean higher growth.
3
 (Moran 2012) 
However, recent paths of development for certain host countries of foreign investment may tell a 
different story. As countries spread farther away from each other on the spectrum of 
development, policies must be in place to protect underdeveloped host countries against profit-
seeking firms looking to exploit underdevelopment to their advantage. While economic theory 
suggests that both the investor and the host of capital benefit when engaging in their comparative 
advantages, it is often those in power of the host country who disproportionately profit rather 
than the economy as a whole.  
In an attempt to prevent potentially negative effects from FDI, these underdeveloped 
countries often impose restrictive policies against foreign firms causing further detriment to their 
own economies. The UNCTAD reported in its 2012 World Investment Report that while the 
changes countries made to their investment policies generally leaned towards liberalization, 
many policy changes resulted in increased restriction (as can be seen below).  
Figure 2:National Regulatory Changes (Global) 
  
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2012. 
                                                        
3 Though the effect of FDI on economic growth in Myanmar is not the main element of this 
thesis, analysis of the incentives of the parties involved is vital in the overall picture. 
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Government responses to recent economic crises thought to have been associated with the 
openness of the policies is a possible explanation for the few changes that resulted in the 
opposite. 
 
Depending on the particular characteristics of the country that attract MNEs, host countries 
face various difficulties regarding foreign investors’ approach to their investments. First, it is 
important to understand the incentives behind an MNE’s decision to invest in a particular 
country. Generally, the assumption that the OLI components are present provides a strong 
reference, more specifically which components are actually relevant to the firms investing. 
Depending on these specific intentions and relevant qualities for MNEs, FDI can affect a host 
economy in a few different ways. Therefore, a host country’s ability to mitigate significant FDI 
inflows lies in the establishment of a clear-cut dynamic foreign investment law that is designed 
with these specific incentives in mind. 
Because Myanmar is rich in natural resources, a large portion of FDI will likely be 
concentrated on extraction. Countries seemingly blessed with natural resources, as is Myanmar, 
often suffer from an unfortunate phenomenon known as the “resource curse,” or the “paradox of 
plenty.” Generally occurring in emerging market countries, the countries too often become 
overly dependent on their non-renewable resources. In this case, a corrupt political structure can 
distort the returns from the development of its own natural resources. The riches go to the hands 
of a few, generally governmental, individuals and not to the indigenous people and their welfare. 
For instance, the IEF argues that corrupt governments in Nigeria and Venezuela have led to 
falling standards of living despite both countries receiving substantial revenues from oil exports. 
(Heritage.org) However, it was the “strong system of private-property protections within a 
market-based democracy, protected by government institutions dedicated to transparent rule of 
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law” (heritage.org, “Property Rights Can Solve the “Resource Curse”) which kept other natural 
resource rich countries such as Canada and Norway from a similar fate. 
Regulation of investments in natural resources often presents specific issues related to 
policies and their efficiency, consistency, and transparency by governments making well-
designed policies even more vital. As explained by Theodore H. Moran, a Senior Fellow at the 
Peterson Institute for International Economics and Professor of International Business 
Diplomacy at Georgetown University, in his book Foreign Direct Investment and Development 
(1998), policies often do not recognize that factors change throughout the life of an investment. 
In the case of natural resources, as Moran explains, “What adds dynamism to the foreign-
investor/host-country relationship is the evolution of risk and uncertainty over the life of an 
investment project” (142). Investors generally take on most of the burden of the initial 
investment, as this is when most of the risk and uncertainty in the success of the project is 
present. Host countries commonly offer specific benefits to investors in this sector, such as fewer 
tariffs or taxes, and special rights to land ownership. However, as the MNEs begin to see their 
investment become profitable, the government oftentimes steps in to renegotiate the terms of the 
agreement. More likely the case in economies during a time of transition is that the successor 
authorities would be incentivized to renegotiate the original terms that the former government 
had agreed upon.   
In host countries, investment policies are important on a broad basis due to the role that 
foreign firms often play in their development. FDI repeatedly has proven to be both harmful and 
beneficial to host countries. A common factor that differentiates the outcome in countries such as 
Canada and Nigeria is often governmental intention. If a country’s government has the 
opportunity to profit and chooses to do so in a corrupt manner, it is emblematic of the overall 
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government influence that detracts from the overall investment climate. Similarly, profit-seeking 
MNEs theoretically invest in countries that do not present overwhelming risk or uncertainty. 
Unfortunately, the absence of corruption in governments does not always encourage investment. 
For instance, if an MNE can shorten the time to begin operating in the country via a crony payoff 
or arrangement, this results in a greater ease of conducting business as well as more immediate 
economic growth. In these few instances, undesirable qualities can be beneficial in the short run, 
but these few instances rarely come without negative effects in the long run. Therefore it is the 
role of governments in host countries to provide transparent and stable investment environments. 
Through consistent regulation, their presence should not influence market activity and, 
consequently, decisions made by investors.  
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2. Regional Foreign Direct Investment 
ASEAN  
Broader Asia was once, and in many instances still is, a region relying on the extraction 
of its natural resources and the utilization of its low-wage labor. However, countries such as 
China are increasingly beginning to produce value-added technology for domestic demand. 
Furthermore, as costs of labor and production continue to rise in East Asian countries such as 
China, increasing amounts of FDI to the region are going to the southeast region (UNCTAD 
World Investment Report 2012). According to UNCTAD, Southeast Asia took in 22% of global 
FDI flows in 2011, compared with 12% prior to the financial crisis (UNCTAD World Investment 
Report 2012). This substantial investor activity has contributed to high economic growth across 
Southeast Asia. FDI from developed nations has and continues to play a significant role in the 
region’s development. Similarly, FDI will likely be responsible for an analogous transition in 
Myanmar if the country receives capital inflows similar to its neighbors. As Myanmar is a 
member of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), it can benefit from the ability to 
observe the experiences of other member states with FDI as well as have a baseline of 
regulations of which to follow and align its own policies. In doing so, Myanmar would look to 
those policies implemented by other ASEAN countries that have successfully attracted foreign 
investment.  
Though ASEAN member countries have only seen substantial capital flows in the last 
two or three decades, much of the region has cooperated and developed together for almost fifty 
years. In 1967, the Foreign Ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and 
Thailand signed the ASEAN Declaration. With the aim of cooperation between these countries in 
economic, social, cultural, technical, and educational realms, and upholding peace and stability 
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in the region, the Declaration symbolized “the collective will of the nations of Southeast Asia to 
bind themselves together in friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, 
secure for their peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity" 
(ASEAN.org). When establishing ASEAN, the leaders recognized the regions’ economic 
disintegration, conflicting objectives and reliance on developed nations. Uplifting, however, was 
their collective aim to becoming a more independent region. By forming different agreements of 
the declaration such as the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) as 
well as sector-specific councils representing agriculture, forestry, and minerals, member 
countries have had a common goal and structure that Myanmar now has the option to follow. 
Though Myanmar will take time to adapt to these agreements, they provide clear goals 
and toward which for Myanmar to aim. For instance, one of the goals of AFTA is to encourage 
member countries to lower intra-regional tariff rates. The latest agreement, named the Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme, member countries are encouraged to reduce their 
tariffs to 0-5%. Though the AFTA agreement has encouraged trade regionally, it is the AIA that 
appears to be of greater relevance to FDI. Promotion of FDI in ASEAN originated with the 
ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement (IGA) of 1987 and more recently, in 1998, with the 
formation of the AIA. In 2009, foreign ministers signed the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement (ACIA) which consolidated the AIA and the IGA with the main components of 
liberalization, protection, facilitation and promotion of investment remaining intact along with 
new provisions improving these previous agreements (ASEAN.org). Lastly, the UNCTAD 
reported in its March 2013 issue of Investment Policy Monitor that negotiations for a Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) began at the 21
st
 ASEAN Summit in 
November, 2012. The agreement reaches out to Australia, China, India, South Korea, Japan, and 
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New Zealand and further promotes the four pillars between ASEAN member countries and these 
listed countries (OECD Investment Policy Monitor Mar 2013). 
Early on, as OECD Senior Economist Stephen Thomsen (1999) explains, governments of 
ASEAN countries believed that intervention in their markets would encourage economic growth. 
Their policies were import substitution-based for much of the 1960s and 1970s whereby the 
countries tried to promote domestic production against imports by restricting sectors or enforcing 
high sector tariffs. However, the lack of competition and technology from abroad limited the 
effectiveness of the policies and economic growth in the region fell through the mid-1980s. With 
Malaysia and Thailand in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and Indonesia and the Philippines making a 
similar transition in the 1990’s, the ASEAN4 began to experience economic growth as they 
began adjusting the theme of their policies towards export-led growth. With currency 
adjustments and policy liberation due to the transition to export-based policies, the ASEAN4 
made a dramatic recovery after 1985 following the poor growth of the previous decade.  
Export-oriented countries have generally seen more immediate growth that appears to be 
less sustainable. Thomsen (1999) argues, “exports can drive rapid economic growth over a long 
period, but technology transfers can do much more to promote sustainable development by 
enhancing indigenous capabilities.” It is generally the transfer of knowledge which encourages 
sustainable long-term economic growth, however, in with export-oriented policies, this 
phenomenon is minimal. Export-oriented policies generally attract firms to extractive or 
manufacturing sectors that only require low-skilled labor.  These industries generally involve 
intensive labor which is great for the host country in the short term because a MNE hires a large 
work force at low wages. However, these types of jobs have steep marginal returns to knowledge 
transfer. Workers receive paychecks for wielding axes in mines but they do not learn managerial 
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know-how or even more efficient techniques and technologies of the business. In the short term, 
the economy benefits from newfound consumers but in the long term, the value of their jobs does 
not increase.  
Fortunately for the development of the ASEAN4, the general trend has been to liberalize 
investment policies. Through the 1990s, the policies led to a few key themes with respect to FDI 
restrictions that still exist today. The common themes in FDI policies across the ASEAN4, as 
Thomsen explains, were screening, foreign equity limits, negative lists, and restrictions on land 
ownership. These laws generally played both a political as well as an economic role in the host 
country. Governments believed that by manipulating the path of capital, they could directly 
impact growth in particular sectors they believed would benefit from most. Alternatively, they 
often restricted investment to those sectors, which they wanted to develop on their own or were 
afraid of losing a competitive advantage to foreign firms. Host countries implemented barriers to 
entry in these sectors through outright restriction to foreign firms, investment through partial 
ownership of a company with a domestic partner, or heavy regulation through taxes and tariffs. 
Additionally, foreign investors shares of domestic companies were limited and foreign investors 
could not own land outright.  
Foreign investors are screened by a country’s Board of Investment, or something of the 
like. The process is meant to both enforce restrictions to certain sectors and prove to the 
indigenous people that foreign companies are being monitored. While the agency through which 
foreign companies are screened and the specifics of the process vary by country, the common 
theme of this process has developed from rejecting FDI to promoting FDI to permitted sectors. 
Because companies need to be compensated to invest in a more heavily regulated country, these 
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investment ministries now aim to promote these incentives such as exemption from tariffs or the 
right to own land in hopes of bringing in more investment.  
Foreign investment policies also generally include restrictions of foreign ownership of 
equity. Acquisitions of local companies by foreign investors can be a faster way to enter a 
market. However, until recently, foreign investment policies generally limited foreign investors 
to minority stakes. As mentioned on Dunning’s OLI theory, a restriction of ownership can be 
seen as a significant barrier to entry and ultimately a deterrent to investment. Furthermore, 
depending on the method of financing, foreigners may also need further approval from other 
agencies. For example, investors in Malaysia may require other permissions from agencies such 
as Malaysia’s Investment Development Authority (MIDA) in which case they must prove how 
their acquisition leads to net economic benefits for the host country.  
The third theme that can be seen across investment policies are lists with investable or 
non-investable sectors. This means their investment commissions now provide a list of sectors in 
which foreign companies cannot invest, rather than providing a list of sectors in which they can 
invest. When providing a negative list, the number of sectors that foreign investors can conduct 
business is greater than the number of sectors in which they cannot. Indonesia for instance, 
switched from a positive list to a negative list in the last 1990’s representing the growing number 
of available sectors to invest. Thomsen explains how the characteristics of these lists, and there 
evolution over time, are a good indicator of the openness of an economy and its development. 
For instance, most ASEAN countries still restrict foreign participation in their banking sectors. 
Furthermore, following the Asian crisis of the late 1990’s, many countries shortened their 
negative lists with hopes of encouraging investment and reintroducing capital into other sectors. 
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The fourth trend that can be found across these countries are restrictions on land 
ownership. Foreign investors prefer to own the land where they operate. Thomsen explains the 
two major disadvantages concerning investors as the insecurity about the future policies with 
respect to land ownership as well as the inability of investors to finance other investments 
against their land as collateral. Though Malaysia does offer opportunities to own land through 
state approval, the other three countries in the study restrict land ownership to time-specific 
leases, generally with only one opportunity to extend the lease.  
The attraction of FDI to the region can be explained through John Dunning’s framework. 
Increasing openness to investment has been the general trend of ASEAN member countries’ 
investment policies. As the foreign investment policies and investment environments in these 
countries have evolved to better attract FDI, MNEs have increased their investment activities in 
the region.  
Figure 3: FDI Inward Stock ASEAN 
 
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report, 2012.  
Commitments to the WTO and ASEAN have pushed the policies, and bodies of government that 
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increased confidence on the part of investors. With this trend, their policies have increasingly 
satisfied the OLI framework. In terms of ownership, the first component of OLI, host countries 
have strengthened their policies on property rights. In return, an investor would have greater 
confidence in bringing their production techniques to a host country without fear of having them 
stolen by a competitor. With respect to improved locational advantages, firms would find fewer 
tax or tariff barriers, increasingly skilled labor forces, and growing markets in which to sell their 
goods, not to mention the regions’ established stock of natural resources. Lastly, greater 
openness of policies specific to foreign ownership have allowed for MNE’s to invest from an 
internal standpoint rather than risking a partnership with a local firm which may have different 
goals. With a domestic partner, there is risk that they could defect once they have learned the 
techniques and have adopted the technologies of the MNE. In this case, the MNE loses a degree 
of competitiveness in the country as well as any licenses or permits that were registered to the 
domestic partner. With the ability to internalize operations, MNEs would still hire domestic 
workers who would gain industry knowledge, but at the same would not be concerned with said 
risks.  
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OECD Policy Review 
One of the foremost organizations on current global economic activities and issues is the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The OECD has produced a 
guideline for investment promotion in host countries called the “Policy Framework for 
Investment” (PFI). With these guidelines, the OECD produces policy reviews of investment 
policies and procedures with the aim to help host governments “mobilize private investment that 
supports steady economic growth and sustainable development, and thus contribute to the 
prosperity of countries and their citizens and the fight against poverty” (PFI Preamble). In the 
case of ASEAN, the OECD has published policy reviews for Indonesia and Vietnam.  Following 
the basis of their PFI, these reviews provide analysis of these country’s investment 
environments, specifically any major developments with respect to relevant policies, economic 
conditions, and government presence. Furthermore, they make invaluable suggestions for 
improvement of anything investment-related. These reviews provide invaluable insight into the 
development of these countries investment environments and assist in analyzing the important 
aspects that prove relevant to Myanmar.  
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Policy Review: Vietnam  
 
In the OECD’s recent review of Vietnam’s investment policies (2009), the authors look at 
the previous investment laws and the change to the newly enacted Investment Law, which was 
implemented in 2006. Furthermore, Vietnam also enacted a new Enterprise Law and Intellectual 
Property Rights Act as recently as 2006. With this investment law, the ministries and local 
governments relinquished their power over investor activities to the government in order to 
ensure consistency and enforcement of the new law. In aligning its new policies with those of the 
WTO, Vietnam had to conform to WTO agreements such as TRIPS (intellectual property), 
TRIMS (investment measures), GATS (services), SCM (subsidies and countervailing measures) 
and ITA (information technology). Prior to these reforms, investment in Vietnam was regulated 
by four different sets of policies set forth during the Doi Moi renovation period following 1986. 
With Doi Moi, Vietnam began its transition to a market-oriented economy from a centrally 
planned economy. One of the key factors in further developing its economy was to understand 
the importance of foreign investment and therefore aimed to be much more open to incoming 
capital, cooperate economically on an international level, and liberalize foreign trade (Hoang, 
Nhue, Houtte, and Dung 2011).  Therefore, as part of this transition came the liberalization of its 
foreign investment and trade policies to develop its private sector. During this time, Vietnam 
introduced the Law of Land (1988), the Law on Foreign Direct Investment (1988), and the Law 
on Private Enterprises (1990), followed more recently by the Enterprise Law (1999). These 
policies drastically changed the investment environment in Vietnam. 
Though the investment environment had improved drastically, it was not until the mid-
2000s when discrimination against foreign investors was tackled. Under WTO criteria, 
discrimination between domestic and foreign investors through policies was prohibited. With 
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Vietnam’s aim to join the WTO, it was forced to address this issue. Though adopted in its new 
investment reforms, Vietnam continued to restrict foreign investment in service industries 
through 2007 when it accessed to the WTO when it agreed to begin releasing many of those 
restrictions. Though the enactment of the new investment policy can be seen though the increase 
in the country’s Business Freedom score from 40 to 60 in 2006, the country’s Investment 
Freedom Score actually slipped from 2009 through 2011 from 30 to 15 and its Property Rights 
score has remained at a low 10 or 15 since the index began in 1995.  
Previously, domestic investors followed the Law on Domestic Investment Facilitation 
whereas the Law on Foreign Investment governed foreign investors. Due to the various 
inconsistencies between these sets of policies, including additional sector-specific provisions, 
there was a lack of clarity and coherence of regulation which likely deterred investors. In 2005, 
Vietnam incorporated the laws regulating foreign and domestic investors into one set of policies 
with the aim to create a more level playing field for all investors (OECD Investment Policy 
Review: Vietnam 38). Though the implementation of this new Investment Law (2005) has been 
set in motion, the OECD reports that at the time of review, Vietnam had not achieved full unity. 
According to the review, there are still many general restrictions applicable to all investors, 
sector-specific restrictions applicable to all investors, as well as a slightly longer sector-specific 
list applicable only to foreign investors. The first list (below) consists of four areas in which 
certain types of private investments are forbidden by domestic and foreign investors including 
the following: 
1. Projects that may be detrimental to national defense, security and the public interest; 
2. 2. Projects that may be detrimental to historic relics, culture, ethics, good customs and 
practices in Vietnam; 
3. Projects that may be detrimental to peoples’ health or destructive to natural resources 
and the environment; 
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4. Projects involving treatment of toxic waste imported in Vietnam, manufacture of 
toxic chemicals or use of toxic agents prohibited by international treaties. 
 
Followed by nine specific sectors in which neither domestic nor foreign firms can invest: 
 
1. Sectors having effect on national defense, security, and social order; 
2. Finance and banking; 
3. Sectors impacting community health; 
4. Culture, information, press and publishing; 
5. Entertainment services; 
6. Real estate; 
7. Survey, search, exploring and exploitation of natural resources; ecological 
environment; 
8. Education and training development; 
9. Other sectors as specified by the law 
 
And lastly, there are fourteen more areas in which foreign investors must meet special 
conditions or requirements such as “company establishment, project coverage, ownership 
pattern, both in and outside the country of a project and forms of permitted legal entities” or are 
restricted entirely. In other words, foreign investors are much less likely than domestic investors 
to be able to invest in these sectors. These areas include the following: 
1. Radio and television broadcasting; 
2. Production, publishing and distribution of cultural products; 
3. Mining and processing of minerals; 
4. Infrastructure development for telecommunications networks, transmission, provision 
of telecommunication and internet services; 
5. Development of public post networks; provision of post and delivery services; 
6. Construction and operation of river and sea ports, airports, airfields; 
7. Transportation of goods and passengers by railroad, air, road, sea routes and inland 
waterways; 
8. Sea fishing; 
9. Production of tobacco; 
10. Real estate; 
11. Import, export and distribution; 
12. Education and training; 
13. Hospitals and clinics; and 
14. Other investment areas included in international treaties of which Vietnam is a 
member, committing limited opening doors to foreign investors. 
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As can be seen in the above groups of restricted sectors and activities, the policy is 
generally broad and can be interpreted by the ministry of investment to mean just about anything. 
For instance, there are many broadly defined sectors such as “sectors impacting community 
health” or “import, export and distribution.” It is in the very distinct differences between these 
last two lists where we can still see the discrimination against foreign investors. While these 
restrictions are expected to be significantly toned down by the end of 2013, according to OECD 
and requirements by the WTO, the stint against foreign investors may remain for some time 
within backhand policies or provincial laws. Furthermore, investments made in sectors specified 
by these conditional lists require that specific conditions be met; however, these “conditions” are 
not clearly defined in the Investment Law. Rather, they are explained in sector-specific laws 
regulated by specific sector ministries where those in power have much more discretion. These 
conditions applying to such large sectors, including “other investment areas included in 
international treaties of which Vietnam is a member” add considerable uncertainty on the part of 
investors. The substantial lack of transparency in this list means that any commitments by 
investors are subject to the interests of the regulators thereby encouraging payoffs and crony 
arrangements. Lastly, as the OECD review argues, Vietnam restricts participation by both 
domestic and foreign investors in important sectors such as finance and banking, entertainment, 
and education and training development thereby limiting the transfer of knowledge from foreign 
firms in these sectors.   
The Investment Law also provides various methods in which a foreign investor can 
conduct or engage in business, subject to the above sector-specific restrictions. According to the 
policy review, foreign ownership of listed companies is limited to 49% in most industries. 
Though this is increased from 30%, this is still a minority stake which means internalization is 
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not nearly as possible for publicly listed companies. However, foreign investors are less 
restricted if associated with privately held companies. The following are potential approaches to 
conducting business as suggested by the Investment Law: 
1. Establishment of wholly domestic- or foreign-owned companies; 
2. Establishment of joint venture business institutions between local and foreign 
investors; 
3. Investment in the form of business co-operation contracts (BCC), build-operate-
transfer (BOT) contracts, build-transfer-operate (BTO) contracts and build-transfer 
(BT) contracts; 
4. Investment in business development; 
5. Purchasing shares or contributing capital to join the management of investment 
activities; 
6. Investment in mergers and acquisitions; and 
7. Other forms of direct investment. 
 
For instance, for certain levels of capital for domestic investors, businesses may not be 
required to complete specific procedures such as registration with all institutions. On the other 
hand, all foreign investors still need to complete all of the registration processes to invest in 
Vietnam. Vietnam has also simplified its appraisal process for large scale or conditional 
investment projects though the OECD suggests that instead of reviewing each individual 
investment project that it implements an overall legal framework for each project to follow. After 
foreign investors complete the registration and appraisal process, if necessary, an investment is 
issued a certificate by certain authorities depending on the sector or area (such as a special 
economic zone). Again, this process adds time onto the preliminary investment process and 
further discriminates against foreign investors. Adding complexity to the registration process has 
been the decentralization of government power by handing over specific licensing 
responsibilities to provincial governments with little training or guidance.  
Moreover, the OECD review reports that different rules apply to nearly every type of 
investment, which can be categorized by size, ownership, or investment incentive. To further 
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streamline this process and assist in enforcing the Enterprise Law and Investment Law, the Prime 
Minister formed a Task Force in September of 2007.The Task Force is charged with aiding 
various Ministries and provincial governments in implementing these laws. They are also 
responsible for further improving the investment process after experiencing case-specific 
obstacles by proposing reforms to policies or practices. The formation of the Task Force has 
helped significantly in the process of decentralization (OECD Investment Policy Review: 
Vietnam 40).  
As can be seen in the graph below, FDI inflows have reacted immensely to the changes in 
Vietnam’s investment policies, especially following the revised laws after 2006. In only one year 
from 2006 to 2007, FDI flows as a % of GDP increased from almost 4% to almost 9% indicating 
a positive response to the newly enacted laws. 
Figure 4: FDI Inflows to Vietnam 
 
Source: World Bank Data. 
Furthermore, the Economists Intelligence Unit reports in its March 2013 analysis of 
Indonesia that as a result of these policies that initially intended to generate rapid economic 
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instability, a more conservative approach to economic policies is expected to take hold through 
2020 in an attempt to stabilize the country’s GDP growth and inflation. While the response to 
this instability is to be expected, the need to impose greater restrictions is unfortunate. It would 
be in Vietnam’s best interest to avoid policies that further restrict investment and discriminate 
against foreign investors. However, in review of policy changes that have occurred over the last 
two decades, the World Bank and International Finance Corporation have reported that doing 
business in Vietnam has improved, with specific reference to the shortened time of registration 
and access to loans, however that certain areas such as starting a business, taxes and protection 
for investors still requires improvement.  
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Policy Review: Indonesia 
 
In the late 1950s, Indonesia made a switch from small scale, private-owned industry to large 
scale, state-owned industry mainly run by military officers. It even nationalized foreign owned 
land. With little FDI outside of the oil sector, Indonesia began experiencing high inflation and 
deficits in their budget and trade following this drastic transition. With an economic crisis 
imminent, the government significantly liberalized their economy such as by introducing the 
Foreign Capital Investment Act of 1967, the basis of the country’s FDI policies until just 
recently. Combined with tax reliefs, improved investment protection, and a faster investment 
approval process, the new investment act propelled Indonesia’s strong economic growth into the 
early 1970s. According to the OECD Policy Review, this framework was considered liberal 
compared to other developing countries at the time. However, once the country began 
experiencing strong economic growth and high revenues from increased commodity prices, the 
government reverted back to its SOE driven economy and phased out the liberal investment 
environment for foreigners. Foreign investors at the time were to progressively decrease their 
presence to minority stakes and joint ventures were required for new investments.  
Indonesia again changed the direction of their policies to support exports and once again, 
attract more FDI. Price declines in oil and a failing economy in the early 1980s encouraged 
Indonesia to create a negative list of sectors that were restricted to foreign investment thereby 
increasing simplicity for investors. In doing so, Indonesia drastically increased the number of 
sectors accessible by foreign investors. Moreover, by 1986,
4
 policies related to foreign 
ownership were also significantly relaxed and the joint venture requirement lifted allowing for 
full foreign ownership.  Though SOEs still had a strong presence in various sectors, with further 
                                                        
4 See the end of this section for a timeline of investment-related events from 1986-2010. 
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liberalization of ownership policies in 1993 and other investment policy reforms throughout the 
mid-1990s, Indonesia received strong FDI flows during this period, the highest just prior to the 
Asian financial crisis. 
During the crisis, uncertainty with respect to economies across Asia as well as Indonesia’s 
investment policies and government, Indonesia saw FDI inflows switch to outflows and its GDP 
collapse. With help from the IMF, Indonesia relieved SOEs and domestic firms of their holds on 
various sectors by allowing for further foreign investment across sectors, lifted tariffs and price 
controls in various commodities, and stopped certain export taxes. The country also experienced 
the resignation of President Suharto in 1998 and a major decentralization in 1999 transferring 
power from the government to the various provinces. With a new president, and the realization 
of the importance of FDI in economic growth, Indonesia implemented a medium-term growth 
plan for the period 2004-2009. A new investment law comprised of an updated negative list, a 
new tax plan for investment, new economic zones, and further decentralization of the 
government was passed in 2007. Though the previous law created in 1967 had been revised 
several times, it was not until 2007 that a fully new law was introduced. The OECD commended 
the law for being better suited for foreign investors. In addition to consistently erasing lines 
between domestic and foreign investors through many revisions of the previous law, the new law 
was more transparent, allowed for greater land use, and improved administration services. Lastly, 
in 2008, a third bundle of economic reforms were introduced. These economy-wide reforms 
were aimed to improve the overall economic environment thereby intending to attract higher 
quality projects and generate more jobs.  
As can be seen in the graph below, FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP fluctuated greatly 
during the time period. In some years even experiencing net outflows which were likely due to 
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uncertain economic conditions in the early 2000s leading up to significant changes in 
government structure. Furthermore, while the ratio to GDP appears to be on a much smaller scale 
than was see in Vietnam, it should be noted that Indonesia’s GDP is significantly larger in 
absolute terms thereby giving an illusion that FDI inflows to Indonesia are not significant. Also, 
the substantial fall in FDI inflows in the late 1990s can be credited as a result of the Asian 
Financial Crisis. 
Figure 5: FDI Inflows to Indonesia 
 
Source: World Bank Databank. 
A few notable fluctuations are those in the 2000s which were can be attributed to Indonesia’s 
implementation of a growth plan as well as further investment policy changes. Furthermore, the 
inconsistency may also be seen related to Indonesia’s inconsistent approach to its policies over 
the last three decades. In this respect, the EIU reported in its March 2013 Indonesia Country 
Report that economic policy is again trending towards nationalistic. For instance, in early 2012, 
President Yudhoyono signed a policy stating that all mines must be at least 51% owned by 
Indonesians in their tenth year of operation. A fall in FDI inflows as a result of this 
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implementation would not be unlikely as the mining sectors attracts substantial FDI inflows to 
the country. 
Throughout the period from 1995 to 2011, Indonesia’s scores in the various freedom index 
components fluctuated, sometimes considerably. For instance, the country’s Investment Freedom 
score began at 50, increased to 70 through the end of the century, and then dropped considerably 
over the next four years to a 30. The index cites “corruption”, “unpredictable” and “non-
transparent” regulations and that foreign exchange and capital transactions are “subject to 
approvals and restrictions” as causes for the country’s low score in this area. Furthermore, 
Indonesia also received noticeably low scores for their protection of property rights and freedom 
from corruption. The IEF refers to the country’s inconsistent court rulings that often end in favor 
of the domestic party and the inability to own land as issues that still need to be addressed. 
Though the country has made an effort to attract investment from abroad, its own policies are 
still improving. In particular, the enforcement of the policies rather than the policies themselves 
can be the biggest drawback. Unlike Vietnam, Indonesia has been more actively attempting to 
attract investment by considerably improving its investment approval process to a one-stop 
service (OECD Investment Policy Review: Indonesia 20). The government is constantly 
improving the protection of land and property as well as intellectual property. However, similar 
to Vietnam, restrictions still exist on foreign equity ownership, though however; the country’s 
move to a negative list of sectors for restrictions on both domestic and foreign investments has 
increased clarity for investors. The OECD reports that “the 2007 Investment Law gives standard 
protection to investors against expropriation and enshrines national treatment” (19). 
Table 1: Timeline of FDI liberation in Indonesia, 1986-2010 
1986  Relaxation of limits of foreign ownership for export-oriented firms 
 Several sectors previously closed to FDI are opened, including retail trade 
1987  Foreign investors allowed on stock exchange 
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1988  16-year ban on new foreign bank entry removed 
 Joint ventures allowed to distribute their products locally 
1989  Switch from Positive to Negative list, with hundreds of Sectors opened to foreign 
investment under certain conditions (e.g. export requirement, co-operation with 
SMEs) 
 Foreigners allowed to purchase 49% of shares of listed companies 
1994  Minimum capital requirement for foreign investment eliminated 
 Nine strategic sectors opened to 95% foreign ownership 
 Up to 100% foreign ownership permitted throughout Indonesia (80% previously) 
 Divestiture requirement reduced to only a token amount of local equity 
 Domestic partnership requirements relaxed 
1995  Ten sectors removed from Negative List, including motor vehicles 
1997  Presidential Decree removes 49% foreign equity limit on purchases of listed shares 
1998  Full foreign ownership allowed in banking 
1999  BKPM no longer requires Presidential signature for approvals 
 Local content programme for motor vehicles phased out 
 Full foreign ownership of holding companies allowed, including through 
acquisitions 
 Several sectors opened further to FDI, including retail, general importing, palm oil 
plantations, broadcasting and downstream operations in the oil sector. 
2007  Investment Law does away with general divestiture requirements 
 New Negative List opens some sectors to greater foreign participation 
2009  Mining Law allows foreign ownership of concessions 
 Electricity Law allows for private operators in areas not served by PLN 
2010  New Negative List opens some sectors to greater foreign participation 
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3. FDI in Myanmar 
OLI in Myanmar 
 As mentioned earlier, John Dunning’s OLI framework is applicable in the case of 
Myanmar as well as in other ASEAN member countries. Because the three components of 
Ownership, Location, and Internalization can be found in many cases throughout the country, 
Myanmar should theoretically attract FDI. However, as discussed previously with reference to 
ASEAN member countries, the presence of these components only prove as relevant as the 
particular sectors in which foreign investors are not restricted from investing. With the 
components that are present in Myanmar, one might be able to infer that firms are likely to 
search out sectors which do not require highly skilled labor, the use of technologically advanced 
techniques, or to make immediate returns from developing consumer markets within the country.  
 In the case of Ownership, explained previously as the rights and protection of intangible 
assets such as copyrights and trademarks, Myanmar is far behind. As reported in the Herbert 
Smith Freehills’ Myanmar investment guide, the only functional law in place is the Copyright 
Act of 1914, which has not been updated for application to contemporary issues. Although 
Myanmar has been a member of the WTO since 1995 and is a participant of the TRIPS 
agreement, which provides protection of intellectual property to other WTO members, Myanmar 
has been granted a grace period for the implementation of these laws through the end of 2013. 
Similarly, there are few laws protecting trademarks or patents. Though trademarks can be 
registered during the registration process with MIC thereby providing some protection against 
particular claims, the registration alone does not provide any sort of absolute guarantee of 
protection.  With respect to patents, there are no laws that offer protection to modern standards. 
Under these conditions, firms utilizing more advanced techniques or technologies may refrain 
from bringing these methods to Myanmar altogether. This impedes potential efficiency on the 
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part of the foreign firm and is a loss of potential technology of which Myanmar could benefit. 
Though minimal, other laws do exist that provide some protection with respect to intellectual 
property, however, it is clear that Myanmar in general does not meet international standards. 
 On the other hand, locational advantages might prove to be the most apparent component 
of the framework found in emerging countries such as Myanmar. As previously described, there 
are numerous advantages related to this component that firms might find in these developing 
countries. Firstly, firms looking to invest in Myanmar may be attracted by the proximity to 
developing markets where they can find low-cost labor and sell their products. Myanmar’s 
sizable population of over 50 million people whom will be looking to become consumers will 
require jobs. Because of the lack of education in Myanmar, these jobs will consist of more labor-
intensive roles and require mainly low-skilled and low-wage labor. These qualifications are the 
beginning of a sequence of development that is commonly seen across much of Southeast and 
East Asia. Though the proximity to potential markets does not seem as relevant today as 
increasingly more goods are being shipped to their final destination rather than being 
manufactured nearby as previously discussed (Larkin 2012), this sizable population will 
increasingly become comprised of consumers looking to purchase goods and services.  
 Also, foreign firms are oftentimes attracted to developing countries for their stock of 
natural resources. Though the government has been largely funded from the extraction of natural 
resources over the years, the country’s intention to join the EITI should decrease the level of 
corruption in the industry and increase confidence for foreign firms. Myanmar has significant 
established reserves of both onshore and offshore natural gas and oil, rare earth metals, and a 
substantial teak industry. The teak industry, in particular, known historically for its poor 
treatment of its labor force, has caused the implementation of sanctions by the US specifically 
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against this industry.  
 Furthermore, foreign firms may find locational advantages through the host country’s 
investment policy. Myanmar’s ASEAN membership and overall need to promote foreign 
investment will lead to lower tariffs (as described in the ASEAN CEPT agreement) and tax 
incentives. The government’s approach will be to provide lower tariffs to those firms that decide 
to operate within special economic zones. According to the Special Economic Zone Law (2011) 
and Dawei Special Economic Zone Law (2011), these areas provide investors with various 
incentives and benefits such as tax reliefs to qualified investors (Herbert Smith Freehills 
Investment Guide). Many investors not interested or not able to invest in these zones due to 
irrelevance will still receive tax breaks for an initial period of time when upfront costs are 
greatest and risks are highest. It is through these promotions that Myanmar is attempting to 
compensate for other difficulties involved in investing in its country. Again, depending on the 
specific asset in which foreign firms are interested will ultimately decide on their decision to 
invest however, investors who may find similar assets and conditions in other countries may be 
attracted to Myanmar with these incentives. 
 The presence of Dunning’s final component, internalization, was less apparent until the 
completion of the 2012 FIL in November 2012. Initial drafts of the law required that a foreign 
firm enter into a partnership or joint venture with a domestic partner, provide minimum levels of 
capital, and rent land from a local partner. Under these requirements, many firms would have 
been deterred from investing in the country. By implementing these laws Myanmar would have 
forgone advantages foreign firms find through internalization. Fortunately, the final law is not as 
strict. For one, there are no requirements forcing foreign firms to enter into joint ventures with 
domestic firms, there are no capital requirements, and foreign investors can lease land without a 
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domestic partner for up to 50 years, with the option to extend by two additional 10 year periods. 
Under these new circumstances and providing that the investment is approved by MIC 
(explained in the next section), a firm will be able to invest in Myanmar on a more direct basis. 
Therefore, the firm will have the ability to further internalize their operations and therefore be 
more compelled to invest.  
 With the further development and modernization of policies, firms will find Myanmar 
improving their laws on intellectual property. They are the locational advantages, the second 
component of the framework, where most firms will seek the greatest rewards. Lastly, the 
advantages firms will find through internalization will be an added benefit, and certainly one that 
was previously unexpected. Though more specific analysis of the new foreign investment law 
may rescind or add to the advantages discussed above, it would appear that Myanmar currently 
satisfies the better parts of two of the three components.  
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Myanmar’s Foreign Investment Law 
Firms seeking specific characteristics, especially those explained by Dunning, have found 
these across much of Asia; especially as countries have become more open to foreign investment 
from a policy standpoint. However, firms are always looking for the next hotspot where labor is 
less expensive than its neighbors or markets have not yet been saturated with similar products. 
International firms are extremely excited as they consider Myanmar to be the “last frontier” in 
Southeast Asia, and globally, with respect to development. (Soon Kim et al. 2012)  The authors 
of the International Enterprise of Singapore report argue, “It is the last sizeable economy and 
market in Asia that remains untapped.” While the presence of Dunning’s components is vital, 
Moran believes it is the overall investment environment that will play the biggest role. In an 
article he wrote in September of 2012 for the Democratic Voice of Burma, an unbiased Burmese 
media organization, he argued:  
The most important factor in attracting FDI is steady improvement in doing-business 
indicators, such as enforcement of contracts, lack of red tape, low incidence of corruption.  
Alongside progress in strengthening the local business environment, other powerful magnets 
to attract FDI are reliable infrastructure and access to well-trained workers and middle-level 
managers and engineers. (Moran 2012) 
 
A potential misconception at this point is that foreign investment is alien to Myanmar and 
vice versa. Why, if Myanmar has always had natural resources and a large population, have firms 
not invested previously? Though attention has surrounded the most recent set of laws put in 
place in November of 2012, Myanmar first introduced a foreign investment policy in 1988 (the 
1988 FIL). The policy aimed to attract foreign investment to energize the private sector. 
However, because sanctions from the US, EU and other developed countries have limited trade 
with Myanmar, the majority of the investment it has received has been from other developing 
countries. The lack of capital from more developed countries limited investments in Myanmar to 
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smaller capital projects or large projects that involved the government and therefore lacked 
transparency. Though Myanmar has been limited in the amount of foreign capital it received, 
neighboring countries such as China and Thailand have been investing in Myanmar for quite 
some time. For instance, Thailand imports much of its natural gas from Myanmar and China has 
been logging much of the northern region.  
Prior to the most recent investment law of 2012, Myanmar put in place the Special Economic 
Zone Law of 2011 (SEZL) as well as the Dawei Special Economic Zone Law of 2011 (DSEZL), 
which provide foreign investors with further incentives such as tax reliefs and allow for a range 
of business activities providing the investors compliance with the specific regulations (Herbert 
Smith Freehill Myanmar Investment Guide). Myanmar enacted the Foreign Investment Law of 
2012 (the 2012 FIL) on November 2
nd
, 2012. Long awaited, the policy took 10 months and many 
drafts between the government and President Thein Sein before approval. With the aim of the 
new investment law stated below, the law would appear to have been relatively liberalized and 
includes incentives to try to attract foreign investors.  
Aimed at the people to enjoy sufficiently and to enable the surplus to export after exploiting 
abundant resources of the country; causing to open up of more employments for the people 
as the business develop and expand; causing to develop human resources; causing to develop 
infrastructures such as banking and financial business, high grade main roads, highway roads 
connected one country to another, national electric and energy production business, high 
technology including modern information technology; causing to develop respective area of 
studies in the entire country including communication networks, transport business such as 
rain, ship, aircraft which meet the international standard; causing the citizens to carry out 
together with other countries; causing to rise economic enterprises and investment business 
in accord with the international norms. (The Foreign Investment Law November, 2012) 
 
As stated in the unofficial translation of Myanmar’s most recent investment policy, Myanmar 
hopes to develop much of its economy through the development and exploitation of its natural 
resources. Furthermore, economic development should benefit its own people while allowing 
foreign firms to enjoy the surplus with the help of the 2012 FIL. This set of regulations is 
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governed by a newly instituted Myanmar Investment Commission (MIC), which includes 
relevant personnel from existing government institutions. The Ministry of National Planning and 
Economic Development (MNPED) compensates these personnel on a salary basis, which should 
remove some of their incentive to approach their jobs in a corrupt manner.   
Though Myanmar’s investment policy reform is just one of many changes the government 
has concentrated on, it has certainly attracted the most international attention during this time of 
transition. Foreign investors are generally attracted to Myanmar because of the country’s stock of 
natural resources. Myanmar was even the world’s largest exporter of rice. While the natural 
resources and amount of usable labor has always been compelling to foreign investors, it has 
historically been the international sanctions and foreign investment policies that have had the 
largest effect on investors’ ultimate decision, or ability, to invest in Myanmar. With sanctions 
currently suspended and likely discontinued in the near future, most of the attention has turned to 
its newly enacted foreign investment policy.  
Because the capital flowing into Myanmar will be towards direct investments which are more 
sustainable and less responsive to economic conditions than financial instruments, Myanmar 
should be less concerned about economic volatility. While its final investment policy appears to 
be more liberal than originally expected, Myanmar still appears to be protecting its small 
economy by leaving much discretion to its Ministry of Investment. Though certain negative 
effects of potentially large capital inflows could result such as a deficit in its current account or 
volatility in its exchange rate and interest rates, it is unlikely with the help from development 
banks and other organizations. In this case, its initial investment policies, especially those 
regarding foreign ownership of equity, will be stricter than those of other neighboring host 
countries and slowly adjust the policies as its own economy develops. Under this assumption, the 
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policies should eventually become less restrictive to MNEs as has generally been the process in 
other ASEAN countries as they have evolved and have experienced the benefits of FDI.  
More recently, in addition to the 2012 FIL, the Ministry of National Planning and Economic 
Development (MNPED) issued the “FIL Rules” in January 2013. These rules provide further 
detail with respect to regulations broadly described in the 2012 FIL. For instance, it repeats the 
requirements related to foreign ownership with added detail clarifying sector-specific regulations 
(O'Shea, Platts, Austen, Nelson and Henderson 2013). The main areas to which this set of rules 
applies are restricted businesses, conditional investments, investment impact assessments, as 
well as many other details. In its explanation of restricted sectors, a key characteristic is the 
considerable length of restricted sectors for full foreign ownership compared with those 
involving joint ventures or minority holdings. Moreover, though the FIL does provide further 
detail and clarification, certain reports explain its repetitiveness of the 2012 FIL therefore some 
uncertainty still remains. 
List of economic activities which are prohibited: 
1. Production of arms and explosives related to defense and its related services; 
2. Economic activities that can damage the rain forest, religious and cultural conservation 
areas, raw lands, mountain farm lands, and water resources; 
3. Economic activities carrying out productions in factories and workshops and carrying out 
agriculture that are in contradiction with the Fertilizer Law, Crop Seed Law, and any 
other agriculture related law promulgated from time to time; 
4. Economic activities importing wastes from overseas, building a factory and carrying out 
productions domestically; 
5. Production of prohibited substances that destroy the Ozone Layer under the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of Ozone Layer and the Montreal  Protocol such as 
Hydrobromo fluo-carbon (HBFC) 34 items, Bromo chloromehane 1 item; 
choloroflourocarbon 5 items Halogenated (CFC) 10 items, Halon 3 items, Halogenated 
CFC 10 items, Carbon Tetrachloride 1 item, manufacturing activities; 
6. Production of persistent organic pollutants including 21 organic pollutants prohibited 
under Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants; 
7. Economic activities bringing used factories, equipments, and businesses from overseas 
and economic activities producing in factories or using in businesses products that are 
dangerous to surroundings, which are stipulated by Environmental Conservation Law, 
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Rules, and Procedures from time to time as those that can damage the environment 
profoundly immediately, in short term and in long term and not suitable for use 
domestically; 
8. Economic activities managing and conserving natural forest; 
9. Prospecting, exploration and production of jade and gemstones; 
10. Small scale and medium scale production of minerals; 
11. Manufacturing and distribution of Asbestos based construction materials; 
12. Administering electricity system; 
13. Trading electricity; 
14. Inspection services related to electricity; 
15. Oil refineries that produce or use substances such as MTBE and TEL that can damage the 
environment and health; 
16. Factories and workshops capable of producing pollutants that can damage the public 
health and dangerous to the public such as environmentally (land, water, and air) harmful 
fumes, smells, powders, sounds, chemicals, and minerals and radiations; 
17. Mining of metallic minerals that include gold in river way areas 
18. Air navigation; 
19. Sea navigation; 
20. Jointly conducting printing and broadcasting media businesses; 
21. Printing and distribution of newspapers, magazines and journals in Burmese and national 
ethnic languages. 
 
Furthermore, the FIL notification rules next provide a list of economic activities which are 
allowed only in joint ventures with citizens of Myanmar: 
1. Production and marketing of mixed seeds; 
2. Production and marketing of native seeds; 
3. Manufacturing and marketing of bakery products including biscuits, wafers, noodles, 
macaroni, spaghetti, etc…; 
4. Manufacturing and marketing of all kinds of confectionery including those of sweets, 
cocoa, and chocolate; 
5. Preserving, manufacturing, canning and marketing of other food products other than milk 
and milk-based products; 
6. Manufacturing and distribution of malt and malt liquors and other brewery products; 
7. Distilling, blending, rectifying, bottling and marketing of all kinds of sprits, beverages 
and non-beverages; 
8. Making and distribution of ice; 
9. Purified Drinking Water business; 
10. Manufacturing and marketing of textile threads; 
11. Manufacturing and marketing of household goods such as enamel ware, cutlery, crockery 
of all kinds; 
12. Manufacturing and marketing of all kinds of plastic wares; 
13. Manufacturing of rubber and plastics; 
14. Packaging business; 
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15. Processing of hides, skins and leathers of all kinds, excluding synthetic leather, and 
manufacturing and marketing thereof, including foot wears, handbags, etc.; 
16. Manufacturing and marketing of paper of all kinds; 
17. Manufacturing and marketing of paper, paper board including carbon paper, waxed 
paper, toilet paper, etc.; 
18. Manufacturing and marketing of chemical products using domestic natural resources; 
19. Manufacturing and marketing of flammable substance, liquid, and gas and aerosol 
(Acetylene, Gasoline, Propane, Hair sprays, Perfume, Deodorant, Insect spray, etc.); 
20. Manufacturing and marketing of oxidizing chemical products (Oxygen, Hydrogen) and 
pressured gas (Peroxide, Acetone, Argon, Hydrogen, Nitrogen, Acetylene); 
21. Manufacturing and marketing of burnable chemical products (Sulfuric Acid, Nitric Acid); 
22. Manufacturing and marketing of industrial chemical gases including compressed, 
liquefied and solid forms; 
23. Manufacturing of raw materials for medicine, pharmaceuticals and drugs, etc...; 
24. Manufacturing of vaccinations using advanced technology; 
25. Prospecting and exploration of industrial minerals; 
26. Large scale exploitation and production of minerals; 
27. Construction of buildings, and manufacturing of prefabricated frames and concretes to be 
used in building bridges; 
28. Transport infrastructure development projects such as bridges, highways, underground 
railways, etc...; 
29. Development of international standard golf-courses and recreation areas ; 
30. Development, sales and rental of residential buildings; 
31. Development and sales of office buildings; 
32. Development, sales and rentals of residential buildings in area connecting to the 
industrial zones; 
33. Development of affordable housing for the public; 
34. Development of new towns; 
35. Domestic air transport services; 
36. International air transport services; 
37. Waterway transport services for travelers and goods; 
38. Construction of new ships and repair services at shipyards; 
39. Construction of warehouses and facilities and providing warehousing services at ports 
40. Production of new trains and engine heads; 
41. Private specialist hospitals and private traditional medicine hospitals; 
42. Travel and Tours services. 
 
Furthermore, while it is the MNPED, which designs the policies, it is the (MIC), a division of 
MNPED that enforces the policy and organizes investment in Myanmar including reviewing 
investment proposals.  MNEs looking to invest in the country must comply and complete a 3-
step process.  Firstly, the company must submit an application to MIC to acquire a MIC permit, 
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followed by an application to DICA, another division of MNPED, to conduct business, and 
finally registering with the Companies Registration Office (CRO). Regulated by the 2012 FIL, 
and more specifically the rules, are the specific sectors in which foreign investors cannot conduct 
business. Most countries across ASEAN have switched to a negative list rather than a positive 
list. In the case of Myanmar, MIC and the State-Owned Economic Enterprises Law of 1989 
(SOEEL) provide an additional list of sectors where investment by individuals other than the 
government is restricted. However, the investment guide continues to explain that the SOEEL 
does permit investments in such restricted sectors on a case-by-case basis providing that the 
investment is through a joint venture with the state, or, if independently by an individual, is 
consistent with the interests of the state. However, to invest in these sectors often requires special 
permission by the relevant ministries and the Central Bank of Myanmar (CBM). A summary by 
Herbert Smith Freehill includes the following:  
 extraction of teak and sale of the same in the country and abroad;  
 cultivation and conservation of forest plantation with the exception of village-owned 
firewood plantation cultivated by villagers for their personal use; exploration, 
extraction, and sale of petroleum and natural gas and “production of products of the 
same” (which is likely to mean derivative products);  
 exploration and extraction of pearl, jade and precious stones and export the same;  
 breeding and production of fish and prawns in fisheries, which have been reserved for 
research by the government;  
 postal and telecoms services;  
 air transport services and railway transport services;  
 banking services and insurance services;  
 broadcasting services and television services;  
 exploration and extraction of metals and export of the same;  
 electricity generating services other than those permitted by law to be carried out by 
private and co-operative electricity generating services;  
 And manufacture of products relating to security and defense which the government 
has, from time to time, prescribed by notification. 
  
While President Thein Sein has been able to reduce much of the strict characteristics that were 
present in previous drafts, the newest law seems to give much more discretionary power to MIC 
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which is likely comprised mostly of older military officials who assisted in designing the laws. In 
this case, a corrupt approach to regulation by MIC could prove detrimental to the law’s 
effectiveness. 
It seems that while the majority of the regulations included in the law align with those of 
neighboring countries, a law that initially stands out is the requirement of investors hiring 
unskilled labor that they hire only Myanmar citizens. A topic concerning most host countries 
with foreign investors is ensuring that there is transfer of knowledge. Furthermore, Myanmar 
citizens must be at minimum 25% of the skilled workforce by the end of two years, increasing to 
50% and 75% by the 4
th
 and 6
th
 years, respectively. Of course, this timeline is at the discretion of 
MIC. Though requiring that a certain percentage of the workforce be of the local people should 
ensure this transfer of knowledge, countries that enact this policy risk losing the investment of 
companies that do not wish to spend time and capital training its workforce. Furthermore, they 
may be concerned that once they have trained their labor with their technology that the workers 
could leave the company to start their own utilizing the same knowledge and technology. 
However, it should be noted that this inclusive policy towards domestic workers allows for 
greater internalization on the part of foreign firms than would partnership or joint venture 
requirements. 
 Because foreign firms generally have more advanced technology, they are likely to be on 
the forefront of development of more technology-intensive sectors such as phone networks and 
internet because foreigners have developed the technology. Therefore, theoretically it should be 
to the advantage of both Myanmar and foreign investors to develop this sector. On the other 
hand, extraction of resources may be more detrimental to the host country as it can be easy for a 
corrupt government to sell off its natural resources without any return to the country. With help 
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from public and private institutions, including the World Bank, consistent regulation of 
transparency and accountability should theoretically help funds flow through to the people. 
However, a strong yet corrupt military presence in the government may harm this growth. 
(Further sectors might be natural resources as foreign firms buy up off-shore oil blocks or on-
shore mines and timber plots. Manufacturing should be encouraged because of the country’s vast 
labor force. The banking sector as there is currently little if any capital flow in the country. 
Developing a banking sector alone would encourage overall growth through encouraging loans.)  
 One danger concerning investors is the lack of privatization in sectors where the 
government has monopolies. In this case, it is likely that foreign investors will be discouraged by 
certain barriers to entry and therefore certain industries may not develop as quickly as others and 
may even limit the development of other sectors. Myanmar will characteristically protect its 
main industries. For instance, if the government has an inefficient monopoly on all construction 
work on roads and railroads, transportation-intensive industries may be limited as to the extent 
that they can transport goods and services. On the other hand, certain sectors will be affected 
more by foreigners than others, in which case it has been found that the concentration of FDI in 
certain sectors did not play a significant role in how fast the economy developed, of course, this 
will also depend on the level of education among other factors.  
The presence of a third party to assist in regulation could be beneficial to both the host 
country as well as potential investors. Myanmar, in particular President Thein Sein, has been 
proactive in its request for assistance by the EITI (Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). 
With the aim to combat the “resource curse,” as it was becoming known by the late 1990’s, the 
UK Prime Minister Tony Blair announced the initiation of the EITI in 2002. The EITI standard 
intends to hold governments accountable to higher levels of transparency. Additionally, the 
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standard aims to reduce governmental instability, which often turns investors away. Finally, the 
indigenous people benefit from the EITI’s implementation through more transparent transactions 
between international corporations and governments, allowing the people to ensure that they are 
compensated for their country’s natural resources. By 2012, the EITI was being implemented by 
37 countries worldwide, with 18 compliant to the EITI standard.  
Though membership to ASEAN, the WTO, and the EITI, are all a plus for foreign investors, 
it must be kept in mind that countries which are members to these organizations still set their 
own investment policies and agendas subject to their commitments. This means that, on 
occasion, a country will choose not to subject a specific sector to these policies and more 
broadly, that not all country’s policies will be the same even if they do satisfy the requirements 
set forth by these organizations. Also, organizations such as the WTO are not always clear as to 
the membership status of a country. While a country may, in fact, be a WTO member, this does 
not always mean that they are satisfying all of the policies set forth by the WTO. Rather this can 
also mean that they are on the path to satisfying the policies. Drafts of the law have proposed 
such acts as the inability to own land or a business as a foreigner. Rather to invest in land, one 
must lease from a local, or invest in a joint venture for a business.  
Will Myanmar’s rich resource base and overall economic potential encourage growth or will 
it lead to a dysfunctional government and economy?  If the right policies are in place, foreign 
investment should encourage growth positively, however, if there is no foreign investment, it 
cannot be a factor in positive growth. Time and time again, economists have seen foreign 
investment play significant roles in economic growth, and not just in the short term. Myanmar 
has been left under a rock for the last 50 years while its neighbors around it have surged in no 
small part due to FDI. Foreign investment could play a significant role in Myanmar’s ability to 
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make a stride to catch its neighbors. The aim is to find the set of policies that have most 
successfully promoted capital inflows and compare this result to Myanmar’s most recent set of 
investment laws.   
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A Risky Investment 
 
When foreign investors perform due diligence on potential investment opportunities in 
another country, there are a series of factors they must consider. Even though the fundamentals 
of Dunning’s OLI might be present, there are other country-specific factors that a firm must also 
consider. In addition to the generic policy issues, there are also country-specific issues. Just as 
much as low-cost labor or transparent and enforced property rights are present in a host country, 
risk and uncertainty must be absent. Of course, any kind of investment anywhere in the world 
involves taking on some degree of risk, regardless if it is in an emerging economy or a developed 
one. However, the risks present in America or the UK are very different from those in 
developing countries. For the purposes of clarification and simple application to ASEAN and 
Myanmar, country-specific risk can be described in two categories. The first being inherent in 
nature and cannot necessarily be foreseen such as a natural disaster and the second being risk that 
can be foreseen and can improve or worsen such as ethnic conflict or political unrest. 
Unfortunately, both are present and very relevant in a firm’s evaluation of Myanmar. 
Inherent risk is not limited to developing countries such as Myanmar but the institutions and 
infrastructure in place to handle such disasters are likely to be vastly different, or in some cases 
nonexistent. Additionally, while many countries in Southeast Asia are at risk of natural disasters, 
Myanmar is the “most at risk” country in Pacific Asia according to the UN Risk Model. OCHA 
believes that Myanmar is in danger of various hazards such as floods, cyclones, earthquakes, 
landslides and tsunamis. Furthermore, that risk is high for medium to large-scale natural disasters 
to come about every couple of years. Just in the last five years, Myanmar has endured two 
cyclones, two earthquakes with a magnitude of 6.8, and flooding that has occurred throughout 
much of the country (appendix A). To make matters worse, much of Yangon, the previous 
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capital of Myanmar and most heavily populated city, sits close to sea level and has a history of 
natural disasters. In 2008, the cyclone “Nargis” left close to 140,000 people dead or missing and 
2.4 million homes destroyed in this region (OCHA). This could prove disastrous for firms in 
agriculture which could lose entire rice paddies, or those in extraction whose mines could flood, 
etc. A firm considering investing in Myanmar risks not only the loss of a factory but also the 
displacement of its workforce and valuable time during business cycles. While OCHA argues 
that increased cooperation between the government and international and local organizations has 
taken place as a result of these disasters, it is only in the aftermath of further disasters where this 
collaboration will prove helpful. Furthermore, while Myanmar will be able to better protect itself 
from natural disasters as it can build better drainage systems, dykes, and houses more adaptable 
to flooding, this will not occur in the immediate future. 
 Geopolitical risk, on the other hand, is mainly limited to developing and transitioning 
countries. According to the Index of Economic Freedom’s Methodology, “Corruption erodes 
economic freedom by introducing insecurity and uncertainty into economic relationship.” In the 
case of Myanmar, geopolitical risk applies in two different situations that may affect an 
investment. Firstly and most relevant to this study on policies, is corruption within the 
government. According to the Corruption Perceptions Index, which ranks countries “based on 
how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to be” according to various business surveys, 
Myanmar ranked 172
nd
 out of 176 countries (Transparency International). Though the specific 
methods of this index, and its own particular flaws, will be discussed later in the analysis, firms 
cannot ignore this dismal ranking. Although this rank will improve with continued reforms, the 
military junta which governed the Southeast Asian country for half a century will not just fade in 
a matter of a few years. Much of the current government is still comprised of former military 
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generals whose incentives are not always in line with those of the country, and even those of the 
current President Thein Sein.  
 Throughout the time of military rule in Myanmar, those in power took advantage of their 
power and profited from Myanmar’s vast resources, hence evidence that Myanmar has 
previously suffered the consequences of the “resource curse.” According to Myanmar’s Ministry 
of Energy, the state owned oil and gas company, MOGE (Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise), 
controls Myanmar’s on and off-shore oil and gas fields for upstream production. In June 2012, 
the opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, stated, “The Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise ... with 
which all foreign participation in the energy sector takes place through joint venture 
arrangements, lacks both transparency and accountability at present,” (Nebehay and Miles, 
reuters.com June 14, 2012) thereby questioning the accountability of the company that runs some 
of Myanmar’s most valued natural resources. The same article further explains how Chevron’s 
shareholders have criticized the company for doing business with MOGE.  
This corruption has also taken a more direct toll on the economy over the years. For instance, 
the government only recently reformed its currency according to its market value. In April 2012, 
Myanmar’s central bank adjusted its currency, called the “kyat”, to managed float at a rate of 818 
kyats to the US dollar from its previous rate of 6.4 kyats to the US dollar (BBC News).  Prior to 
the adjustment, the variation between the official rate and the black market rate (closer to the 
most recent managed float rate) deterred firms from investing in Myanmar. Furthermore, the 
country’s central bank, a previously detrimental institution comprised of military officials rather 
than economists, is also making a significant transformation. As of February 7
th
, the government 
announced plans to end the military’s role in the central bank. Previously, only military 
personnel were allowed to hold positions in the central bank but with new legislation, the country 
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hopes to have economists and bankers running the show (Ten Kate et al. 2013). With severe 
political risk, the policies themselves seem to fade to the background and the issue becomes a 
question of transparency and consistency. In other words, the specific tax rates or capital 
requirements become ambiguous. Rather the risk becomes the degree of corruption within the 
government and their consistency in enforcing the policies. Furthermore, especially applicable in 
transitioning countries, is whether or not the same government and policies will be in power just 
a few years down the line. As mentioned previously with respect to natural resources, this risk 
could result in renegotiations of agreements or even losing the ability to operate in Myanmar 
altogether.  
 Another geopolitical risk that can be just as concerning for an investor is the risk of a 
conflict between ethnic groups affecting their asset in the region involved. Myanmar is 
comprised of various religious and ethnic backgrounds, many of which have been engaged in 
conflict since the country’s independence from Britain in 1948. Although ethnic conflicts arise 
across much of the country, the two that attract the most attention are the Kachin conflict and the 
Rohingya Conflict. According to the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, the conflict in 
Kachin, the northernmost state that borders China, has existed for over fifty years. Though a 
cease fire was agreed upon on January 13, 2013, the fighting between the Myanmar Army and 
Kachin Independence Army continues (Govindankutty 2013). Residing in the coastal state of 
Rakhine are the Rohingyas, who are of Muslim descent from neighboring Bengal and are a 
minority in Myanmar. Under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, they are not recognized as 
citizens and are referred to as illegal immigrants by the government. Most recently in 2012, a 
series of violent riots occurred between the Rohingyas and the Rakhine Buddhists resulting in 
many deaths. This particular conflict required President Thein Sein to declare a state of 
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emergency. The Eurasia Review reports that “only nine armed ethnic groups out of eleven have 
reached even a preliminary stage in the negotiation of peace pacts with the Myanmar government 
at respective levels.” (Govindankutty 2013) In this case, armed conflicts put in danger not only 
a factory or farm, but also the wellbeing of a labor force and potential consumer markets.  
In response to Myanmar’s corrupt government, and its historically poor approach to these 
conflicts, many western countries have implemented economic and political sanctions against 
Myanmar since the early 1990’s. The US, EU, Canada, and Australia, for example, put in place 
precise laws due to the fear that almost any exchange of a good or service could be traced back 
to funding Myanmar’s government and therefore the military. The sanctions restricted almost all 
transactions with the Burmese people, limited travel to the country, and strongly enforced an 
arms embargo. With recent political reforms, many of these countries have suspended their 
sanctions against Myanmar; however, the removal or reinstatement depends on Myanmar’s 
progress forward. The US, for example, intends to use the possibility of reinstatement of these 
sanctions to further encourage reforms in Myanmar. An unfortunate side effect of this strategy 
will be the added uncertainty in the eyes of investors. In an interview with the Financial Times 
on July 11, 2012, President Thein Sein asked desperately for the removal of sanctions. He told 
the FT, “It’s only if you lift the lid entirely that it allows everything to come out…It is extremely 
important that sanctions be lifted – both financial and other economic sanctions – to make 
possible the sort of trade and investments that this country desperately needs at this time.” 
(Robinson 2012) With the possibility for the sanctions to be reinstated looming, most investors 
from these countries will wait until there is more clarity. 
The presence of these different risks, both climate-related and geopolitical, will likely hinder 
the amount of investment received from abroad but may also cause discrimination by the 
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backgrounds of investors. Investors in the region will have likely heard this ongoing story for 
quite some time compared to investors from America or the EU who have only shown interest 
since the reforms began in 2010. These regional investors will have a deeper understanding of 
the various conflicts, know the major players, and likely have connections to the area compared 
with western investors who do not have this depth of knowledge. Though a potential 
disadvantage for these regional investors may be their capital, their knowledge may provide a 
greater degree of comfort making them the more likely candidates to make the next step from 
interest to an investment. Alternatively, foreign firms may have a greater appetite for risk due to 
their willingness and ability to commit more capital to an investment. 
Though much excitement surrounds the recent reforms in Myanmar, there are clearly some 
potential challenges that may evolve into substantial issues for a foreign firm. Foreign firms will 
make their decision to invest based on the quality of the asset and their evaluation of these risks 
that may arise. Consistent with other conclusions, the viability of the argument will ultimately 
depend on the relevance of the risk to the asset in which the firm seeks to invest. A firm looking 
to mine and extract rare earth metals will encounter different risks and obstacles than one 
looking to sell a certain technology. However, these general risks, both inherent to the country 
and not, will likely be the basis for the obstacles which most firms will encounter. 
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4. Econometrics Analysis 
The majority of literature written on the determinants of FDI flows generally concentrates on 
the macro economical and institutional factors of the country or region. In these studies, 
investment policies are often recognized through the tax rates and government spending that 
result. However, because this analysis is designed to concentrate on the effects of the laws 
themselves, the variables must be designed to capture the particular laws. A straightforward 
approach to studying the effect of the specific laws would be to designate dummy variables to 
each law. For instance, if a country had a law in place, the value of the variable would equal 1 
and if it did not implement that law, the variable would equal zero. Regrettably, a few issues 
arise with this method rendering it an ineffective and inefficient approach to this analysis. 
Two major issues that arise with this approach seem to render this method ineffective. 
The first issue is the lack of variation across such a large number of independent variables. 
Foreign investment policies often consist of hundreds of regulations, most of which are similar 
but still oftentimes vary only slightly. How would one differentiate dummy variables for land 
ownership of 70% versus 30% by foreigners through a dummy variable? How would one capture 
the difference in capital requirements by multinational enterprises in a partnership with a 
domestic firm? With this many variables with value of only either 0 or 1, and many changing 
during the same year as countries revise or enact entire investment policies, the data would not 
generate enough variance for the variables to show significant relationships to the dependent 
variable.  
Secondly, the laws themselves are not always enforced consistently by the government 
therefore the specific policy would be misrepresented in its effect on capital flows. In this case, 
not only would there be insufficient variation across the independent variables, but the little 
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variation that would exist is not always reliable. To solve for these issues, variables must be used 
that account for these inefficiencies. Ideally, the variables would capture these laws, their 
revisions on a yearly basis, and the efficiency with which they are enforced in a way that is 
consistent across countries but that also sees a greater variation than from only 0 to 1. 
Fortunately, the Index of Economic Freedom, an index generated and published by The Heritage 
Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, captures the essence of the regulations imposed by the 
country in combination with the efficiency with which they are enforced by that country’s 
government. By using an index such as the Index of Economic Freedom, the issues mentioned 
above are accounted for because the countries are graded on both the policies that are in place as 
well as the efficiency and consistency with which the government enforces those policies. 
Furthermore, the grades given on the ten different components of economic freedom range from 
0 to 100 thereby provide a much larger range of variation.  
Originating on Adam Smith’s theories dating back to 1776, the Index of Economic 
Freedom grades countries on the openness of their economies. The Heritage Foundation provides 
a specific framework and methodology that allows for identifying fluctuations in a country’s 
score to specific changes or additions in their policies. Countries are graded from 0 to 100 on a 
culmination of 4 “pillars” which can be broken down further into ten different categories (see 
next page for general breakdown and the appendix for a more specific methodology). It then 
takes the grades from each component and calculates an equally weighted average for the 
country’s overall economic freedom. Using these categories to represent the laws allows for 
more variation and is a consistent and reliable set of grades that date back to 1995, allowing for 
fluctuation across time as well.  
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Index of Economic Freedom 
Pillars Components 
Rule of law Property rights 
Freedom from corruption 
Limited government Fiscal  freedom 
Government spending 
Regulatory efficiency Business freedom 
Labor freedom 
Monetary freedom 
Open markets Trade freedom 
Investment freedom 
Financial freedom 
 
As with any study with imperfect data, and especially those studying emerging markets, 
some issues with this approach remain. For instance, the index’s analysis generally looks at data 
and conditions anywhere from 6 months to 1.5 years prior to the year the study is published. This 
means that policy changes occurring in 2005 will not be reflected until the 2006 or 2007 index 
therefore some degree of lag is needed to more accurately reflect changes in FDI flows resulting 
from changes in policies and governance. Another unfortunate issue is the reliability of the 
methodology as it pertains to emerging markets. For instance, the index’s freedom from 
corruption component is based on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. 
Derek Tonkin, a member of the Advisory Board of Hong Kong-based investment and advisory 
company Bagan Capital and the Chairman of the website www.NetworkMyanmar.org, argues 
that the TI’s index is not always as reliable with respect to ASEAN countries as may be 
perceived. Tonkin delves deeper into the most recent grade given to Myanmar as it was 
surprisingly given the 172
nd
 place out of 176 rated countries, the same rating given to Myanmar 
prior to the government reforms. He argues that Myanmar’s unfortunate grade is due to a 
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disproportional amount of weight given to the unfortunate human rights violations rather than the 
recent economic and political advances. He states: 
TI have traditionally, and not without justification, given considerable weight to the level 
of human rights violations in a country as a broad indicator of the level of corruption. As 
a result, in the virtual absence of reliable data, TI has been led to conclude that Myanmar 
must inevitably be close to the bottom of the list. The reality on the ground though is 
rather different. (Tonkin 2012) 
 
With improvements in the construction of the variables themselves (in this case the use of an 
established index), of course, comes with some limiting factors. The reality is that while these 
difficulties will be accounted for as efficiently as possible, these types of misunderstandings in 
the specific methodologies of the index could prove to be a limiting factor. Furthermore, 
economic factors and country-specific dummy variables such as the size of the economy, the 
presence of conflict (mostly ethnic in Myanmar), and whether sanctions are or were in place will 
be necessary to represent the factors which the index does not reflect. 
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Model 
In this model, FDI flows are a function of: 
 
FDIRGDP=f(RGDP, REX, STDEV_REX, ECONFREE(PROPRIGHT, CORRPTFREE, 
FISCFREE, GOVSPEND, BIZFREE, LABRFREE, MNTRFREE, TRDFREE, INVESTFREE, 
FINFREE), CONFLICT, ECONSANC) 
 
Where: 
 
Dependent Variable: 
FDIRGDP: The ratio of FDI inflows to real GDP.  
 
Independent Variables: 
The determinants of foreign direct investment in this model can be grouped into three different 
categories: 
 
Economic Indicators: 
LOGRGDP(-1): The log of the lagged real GDP. 
 
LOGREX(-2): The log of the lagged real exchange rate (where 100=2005 dollars). The real 
exchange rate calculated as: (host country official exchange rate (LCU per US$, period average) 
x host country consumer price index (2005=100)) / US Consumer price index (2005=100) 
 
STDEV_REX(-2): The lagged standard deviation of the real exchange rate. Calculated as: the 
variance of the yearly average for all countries of the real exchange rate (defined above).  
 
FDIRGDP(-1): The lagged ratio of FDI inflows to real GDP. 
 
Economic Freedom: 
ECONFREE: The country’s overall score in the Index of Economic Freedom Index. 
 
PROPRIGHT: Score the host country received for its property rights. 
 
CORRPTFREE: The score the host country received for its freedom from corruption. 
 
FISCFREE: The score the host country received for its fiscal freedom. 
 
GOVSPEND: The score the host country received for its government spending. 
 
BIZFREE: The score the host country received for its business freedom. 
 
LABRFREE: The score the host country received for its labor freedom. 
 
MNTRFREE: The score the host country received for its monetary freedom. 
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TRDFREE: The score the host country received for its trade freedom. 
 
INVESTFREE: The score the host country received for its investment freedom. 
 
FINFREE: The score the country received for its financial freedom.  
 
Other factors: 
CONFLICT: A dummy variable where 1=Presence of armed conflict; 0=No armed conflict 
 
ECONSANC: A dummy variable where 1=Existing economic sanctions on the host country by 
another country; 0=No economic sanctions 
 
Therefore: 
 
FDIRGDP = β0 + βRGDPRGDPit + βREXREXit + βPROPRIGHTPROPRIGHTit + 
βCORRPTFREECORRPTFREEit + βFISCFREEFISCFREEit + βGOVSPENDGOVSPENDit + 
βBIZFREEBIZFREEit + βLABRFREELABRFREEit + βMNTRFREEMNTRFREEit + 
βTRDFREETRDFREEit + βINVESTFREEINVESTFREEit + βFINFREEFINFREEit + 
βCONFLICTCONFLICTit + βECONSANCECONSANCit + ε 
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Economic Rationale and Expected Signs 
 
The expected relationships and economic rationale behind the inclusion of each 
independent variable are explained below.  
Economic Indicators 
βRGDP>0: As the market size increases in the host country, MNEs have more consumers of their 
products. The GDP is lagged for two reasons, the first is because firms are not able to know the 
level of the GDP until after an economic period, and it is even longer before the make the 
investment. The second reason is to avoid heterogeneity with the dependent variable.  
 
βREX<0>: As the real exchange rate either appreciates or depreciates, MNEs can be affected in 
various ways therefore the estimated effect is indeterminable. A depreciation of the real 
exchange rate should make an investment project less expensive and exports from the country 
more desirable and therefore would attract foreign firms to conduct business. However, this same 
fluctuation may also cause the exports to be less profitable in dollar terms thereby decreasing 
overall profits to the firms. On the other hand, an appreciation of the real exchange rate would 
cause an investment project to be more expensive for a foreign firm yet they would benefit from 
higher profits. A two period lag is imposed on the variable to avoid any reverse causality 
between the real exchange rate, real GDP and FDI inflows. 
 
βSTDEV_REX<0: A wide standard deviation of the real exchange rate signifies instability in the 
exchange rate. Therefore investors are unable to accurately predict real profits which increase 
uncertainty surrounding an investment in the host country. A two period lag is imposed on the 
variable to avoid any reverse causality between the real exchange rate, real GDP and FDI 
inflows. 
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Economic Freedom Variables 
βECONFREE>0: [Not included in the estimations] Though the rationale for each component of the 
index can be found below, economically free countries provide an environment in which “each 
person controls the fruits of his or her own labor and initiative.” (Heritage.org) It is in these 
countries where governments provide protection for essential human rights but do not overly 
influence the economy. 
 
Rule of Law 
βPROPRIGHT>0: The existence and enforcement of property rights that efficiently protect the assets 
of domestic and foreign firms should reduce the risk of losing those assets thereby increasing the 
firms comfort in investing in the country. 
 
βCORRPTFREE>0: As the level of corruption within the government falls, or in this case, the score 
based on freedom from corruption increases, more firms will invest in the country. 
 
Limited Government  
βFISCFREE>0: A measure of taxes in the host country, a higher score indicates less tax burden on 
investors therefore giving them greater incentive to invest. 
 
βGOVSPEND>0: A measure of the amount of government expenditure in the host country, a higher 
score indicates less government spending therefore less risk of budget deficits, sovereign debt, 
and crowding out of the private sector allowing for investors to have greater confidence in the 
host economy. 
 
Regulatory Efficiency 
βBIZFREE>0: A measure of the government’s regulation of business, a higher score indicates 
greater efficiency in starting, operating and closing a business therefore giving firms more 
incentive to invest. 
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βLABRFREE>0: A measure of the framework regulating the host country’s labor market, a higher 
score gives indicates greater freedom from regulations such as minimum wages, severance 
requirements, and hiring and working hours. A higher score allows for firms to more easily 
utilize the host country’s labor and therefore gives firms greater incentive to invest. 
 
βMNTRFREE>0: A measure of price stability through inflation and price controls, a higher score 
indicates less government intervention that distorts market activity therefore gives investors 
greater confidence in the market and more incentive to invest. 
 
Open Markets 
βTRDFREE>0: A measure of the presence of tariff and non-tariff barriers, a higher score indicates 
less cost associated with imports and exports and therefore gives firms more incentive to trade 
with or from within the host country. 
 
βINVESTFREE>0: A measure of the freedom of capital flows, a higher score indicates greater ease 
for investment capital to flow without restriction into different investment activities and across 
borders therefore giving investors more confidence as to the liquidity of their investment thereby 
giving them more incentive to invest. 
 
βFINFREE>0:A measure of banking efficiency and the banking industry’s independence from the 
government in the host country, a higher score indicates less government intervention and 
regulation, more development in financial and capital markets, and increased openness to 
competition. Therefore greater financial freedom is more attractive to firms. 
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Dummy Variables 
βCONFLICT<0: The presence of internal geopolitical unrest could result in disturbances to 
production and consumption therefore decreasing firms’ incentive to invest. 
 
βECONSANC<0: The presence of economic sanctions on the host country by another country could 
result in added instability or the direct restriction of investment in the host country therefore 
decreasing firms’ incentive, or ability to invest. 
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Method  
 
To estimate the model, a fixed effects regression was used to analyze panel data across 
eight ASEAN member countries including Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,, Philippines,  
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam (Brunei was not included due to a lack of data for the time 
period). According to Baltagi (1995), panel data provides more informative results through 
greater variability, less collinearity between the independent variables, and more degrees of 
freedom. (p. 3) Baltagi also recognizes a common issue found in time series and cross-sectional 
data to be heterogeneity. With panel data, however, he argues that heterogeneity is generally not 
an issue though to still account for any possible time invariance, a lagged FDI flows variable is 
included in the estimation. Also, panel data provide many advantages in empirical analysis. A 
common characteristic of panel data is that its time series dimension is generally shorter than a 
time series of a single cross-section. The dataset used in this study ranges sixteen years across 
eight cross-sections providing a sizable number of observations.  
Similar to Ramirez (2010), the stacked model was estimated using the least squares 
method with fixed cross-sections and cross-section weights to account for varying country 
characteristics such as market size, and white period standard errors and covariances. He argues 
that significant economic events occurring in developed countries affect FDI flows to all 
countries in Latin America thereby causing cross-country correlations among error terms. A 
similar occurrence is likely in ASEAN countries. Lastly, Ramirez suggests that the fixed effects 
method is able to capture time-invariant differences across countries through the constant term. 
Furthermore, it was necessary to impose a lag on certain independent variables to account 
for economic rationale and econometric concerns. For instance, when firms look for growing 
consumer markets in which to invest, they look to the size of the market, the GDP or GDP per 
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capita more specifically. Because economic indicators are not reported until the following 
economic period, it theoretically takes at least until the data is reported that firms can confirm 
quantitatively that the market is growing, and therefore their investment is lagged by at least this 
amount of time. Additionally, because real GDP is the denominator of the ratio that is the 
dependent variable, the real GDP is lagged in the estimation to avoid any heterogeneity. 
Furthermore, a log of the lagged FDI variable as a percentage of GDP was included in the 
estimation to account for potential autocorrelation in FDI flows. The economic rationale is that 
firms with investments in host countries must continue to invest capital in order to continue 
operating. Also, the characteristics that attracted FDI in the previous year are likely similar in the 
current year. Therefore the annual relationship between FDI inflows for a given country is not 
random.  It should be mentioned, however, that by including the lagged dependent variable in the 
estimation, there is potential for downward bias in the fixed effects specification. Lastly, time 
series regressions often contain correlated residuals with their own lagged values. To account for 
this issue, a first-order autoregressive element is incorporated into the model. With this addition, 
the model accounts for each residual in the previous observation in the current observation.  
In general, they were the macroeconomic indicators such as GDP that required a lag. 
While a similar situation would apply to firms waiting for changes in foreign investment 
policies, the index components used in this study do not account for policy changes until at least 
the following period therefore it is inherently lagged.  
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Data 
For data, the study uses the World Bank as a resource for macroeconomic panel data for 
the countries mentioned above. On occasion, the IMF, and UNCTAD databases were also used. 
Data for Myanmar posed more challenges, as databases such as the World Bank and even the 
EIU believe the country has a history of falsely reporting their statistics. In this case, the 
quantitative analysis was limited to the countries mentioned above and was related qualitatively 
to Myanmar through the policies that it has implemented in its Foreign Investment Law of 2012. 
Though the Index of Economic Freedom is very helpful, certain additions were necessary 
as not all of the components for every country are given back to 1995. For instance, the labor 
freedom component did not have given any scores for any countries for the period 1995-2004 
therefore some revisions were necessary. In this case, the Economic Freedom of the World 
Index, published by the Fraser Institute was also very helpful as many of its own components are 
similar, however, until 2000; this index was only on a five year basis. Therefore, in the graded 
countries, the 1995 score was given and then a constant yearly change was applied to reach the 
2005 score. In the case that the countries were not graded by this alternative index, the 2005 
score was applied to the previous 10 years to prevent lost observations for other variables during 
this time period. This was necessary for Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Fortunately, in the case 
of these three countries, there is minimal variation of this particular variable for the years that 
were given by the index therefore it can be inferred that the previous decade would be similar.   
Lastly, there are two dummy variables representing armed conflicts in the region and 
sanctions on the country. The armed conflicts data is from the Department of Peace and Conflict 
Research at the Uppsala Universitet. The variable accounts for both government and non-
government associated armed conflict. The sanction variable uses the Peterson Institute for 
International Economics which provides a timeline of global economic sanctions.  
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Descriptive Statistics 
A table outlining the descriptive statistics for the variables included in this study can be 
found below. Additionally, descriptive statistics for each country and a correlation matrix can be 
found in the data tables and descriptive statistics section.  
With respect to the data, there are a few notable findings. For instance, the mean FDI 
inflows as a percentage of GDP over the time period was found to be 5.15%. However, 
Singapore’s average FDI inflows ratio was 16.23%, roughly two standard deviations higher than 
the mean for the sample. This is likely due to Singapore’s role as an international financial hub 
for Southeast Asia though Singapore’s mean absolute real GDP is significantly smaller than 
other countries in the sample.  
In addition, the correlation between many of the index variables is also of concern. One 
might argue that a country would be likely to receive similar scores on their business freedom 
and investment freedom, or government spending and fiscal freedom. Interestingly, these 
examples only received correlations of .71 and .29, respectively. More interestingly is the high 
correlation between business freedom and property rights of .87. A potential explanation is that 
in countries inefficient in regulating businesses are also likely to regulate property laws 
inefficiently. Furthermore, these variables also tend to have higher correlations with other 
variables in the index indicating that these two variables are strong representatives of the overall 
economic freedom in the countries studied. These correlations were considered prior to 
estimating the regressions. 
Lastly, few ASEAN member countries had economic sanctions imposed upon them 
resulting in the very low mean seen below. Unfortunately, this variable is not expected to be 
strongly related to FDI inflows due to the characteristics of the dataset.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (all countries) 
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5. Results 
 
Results for five estimations are given in table 2 below. As previously mentioned, the results 
were found using the least squares method with white period standard errors and covariances. 
The fixed-effect estimations below estimate the relationship between FDI inflows as a ratio to 
real GDP and each independent variable, with the 4
th
 and 5
th
 estimations further including the 
dummy variables econsanc and conflict. Additionally, a logarithmic function was imposed on all 
of the independent variables except for the dummy variables. This follows the expectation that 
none of the relationships between the independent variables and FDI inflows are linear.  
The first interesting finding is that the constant term for each regression was found to be 
negative and statistically significant. This suggests that the functions estimated generally slope 
upward showing positive relationships with most of the independent variables. Furthermore, with 
some exceptions, almost all coefficients are in the expected direction, especially for those 
variables that were found to be statistically significant. 
The lagged real GDP was found to be statistically significant in all regressions except for the 
second where the switch to the standard deviation of the exchange rate was also found to be 
insignificant. The positive significance of the lagged real GDP suggests that increased market 
size in the host country in the period prior to the MNE’s investment attracts FDI flows therefore 
suggesting that firms are attracted to larger consumer bases. For instance, in the first regression, 
a 1% increase in the real GDP in the previous year increases the ratio of FDI inflows to real GDP 
by .55 percentage points, holding all other variables constant. In the case of regressions 3-5, real 
GDP is also found to be statistically significant with similar effects on FDI inflows. The slightly 
lower coefficient in the second regression may suggest the presence of negative bias between 
real GDP and the standard deviation of the real exchange rate. In this case, heteroscedasticity 
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could also be present. As the market size increases (an increase in real GDP), the corresponding 
currency is likely to become more liquid and stable thereby decreasing standard deviation.  
 Interestingly, the lagged real exchange rate was found to be statistically significant 
whereas the standard deviation of the real exchange rate was not in the second regression. One 
would expect that firms would consider the stability of the exchange rate to be of more concern 
than the real exchange rate, especially given that most of the currencies considered in this study 
are very inexpensive on a unit by unit basis compared with the US dollar. However, according to 
the results below, a statistically significant and negative relationship was found between the real 
exchange rate and FDI flows. For instance, in the third regression, a 1% increase in the real 
exchange rate (a depreciation of the host country’s currency) would decrease FDI inflows by .15 
percentage points, holding all other variables constant. A possible explanation could be that 
firms believe they can increase their profits from their investment in the host country if the host 
country’s currency appreciates in value against the US dollar. The statistical significance of the 
last economic independent variable, the lagged FDI inflows, suggests that countries that attract 
FDI in the previous year would likely attract FDI in the current year. For instance, a 1% increase 
in FDI inflows in the previous year would increase FDI inflows in the current year by .43 
percentage points (third regression). The inclusion of this variable in each estimation accounts 
for the heterogeneity that would otherwise bias the results. 
 With respect to the economic freedom variables, only the property rights variable (fifth 
regression), the government spending variable (first regression), the business freedom variable 
(fourth regression), the trade freedom variable (fourth regression), and the investment freedom 
variable (first and fourth regressions) were found to be statistically significant. A note to be kept 
in mind is that the index provides scores based on the overall component in the host country and 
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does not separate conditions for domestic investors and conditions for foreign investors.  In the 
case of the property rights variable, a 1% increase in the score the host country received for its 
protection of property rights would increase FDI inflows by .74 percentage points, holding all 
other variables constant. This variable strongly represents the first component of Dunning’s OLI 
framework, Ownership, and therefore the statistical significance of this variable is not surprising 
as MNEs should give considerable attention to the protection of their property in host countries. 
Somewhat surprising, though not statistically significant, is the positive relationship with the 
freedom from corruption variable. This may suggest, as discussed in the introduction, that 
corruption may not always be disadvantageous to MNEs. For instance, a firm would be better off 
if it can register their business in the host country more quickly through a corrupt-type agreement 
with the registration ministry rather than wait the seemingly long registration period. Though this 
would be considered in the corruption grade, it is this type of corruption that ironically can have 
a positive effect. Also surprising is the statistical significance of the government spending 
variable while the fiscal freedom variable was found not to be statistically significant. Generally, 
it would be in a MNE’s interest to avoid taxes to the best of their ability and to endorse 
government spending. While government spending is often used to recognize the status of a 
country’s infrastructure or school system, it also includes military expenditures. In the case of 
Southeast Asian countries, military expenditure could translate to armed conflict which would 
detract from FDI inflows, as is represented below. Furthermore, the Heritage foundation believes 
that government spending can cause budget deficits which ultimately have a negative effect on 
the overall economy. 
 One of the stronger relationships was found between FDI inflows and the business 
freedom variable. This variable represents the overall efficiency of the government in regulating 
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business. For instance, the score assigned by the Heritage Foundation captures, among other 
similar measurements, the cost and time necessary to start a business, obtain licenses and 
registrations, and close a business. The results show that for a 1% increase in the business 
freedom score, FDI inflows would increase by 1.19 percentage points, holding all other variables 
constant. The last two economic freedom variables that were found to be statistically significant 
were trade freedom and investment freedom. The trade freedom variable, a score awarded to 
each country based on their tariff rates and non-tariff barriers affecting imports and exports of 
goods and services, was surprisingly found to be negatively related to FDI inflows. A possible 
explanation for this finding could be that the countries that impose higher tariff rates and non-
tariff barriers are those that already receive higher FDI inflows and thus present a reverse 
causation effect. On the other hand, the investment freedom variable was found to be statistically 
significant and positively related in both the first and fourth regressions, as expected. The 
investment freedom variable, based on the score the country receives for the ease with which 
investors can transfer their capital resources, is unlike the other economic freedom variables in 
that it more directly addresses the issues specific to foreign investors. For instance, it gives 
consideration to the variation in regulations applied to foreign investors compared with domestic 
investors. Therefore, a 1% increase in the score the host country receives on its investment 
freedom would increase FDI flows by roughly .5 percentage points, holding all other variables 
constant.  
 The positive and statistically significant relationship between FDI flows and sanctions 
was certainly unexpected. A possible explanation for this finding could be derived from the 
intention of countries when implementing sanctions in the first place. Oftentimes countries 
impose sanctions on other countries with the belief that by restricting capital flows to that 
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country, that country would conform to the desire of the imposing country or suffer the effects of 
losing significant capital flows. Under this assumption, the absence of capital from these 
countries may reduce competiveness in the host country and therefore actually increase capital 
flows from other countries. 
 Lastly, as can be seen at the bottom of the table, the adjusted R
2
, the F-statistic, and the 
Durbin-Watson show that the independent variables, overall, are good indicators of FDI inflows. 
An adjusted R
2 
of .7 shows that 70% of the variance in FDI inflows is explained by the variance 
in the independent variables. The F-statistics shows that, except for the final estimation, the 
variables are a good fit and finally, the Durbin-Watson statistic around 2 shows that there is no 
evidence of autocorrelation in any of the estimations. 
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Table 3: Estimation Results 
Dependent Variable: log FDIRGDP (t-statistics shown below coefficients in parentheses). 
Regressions 1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
C 
 
-2.86 
 
-3.52 
 
-13.42 
 
-16.55 
 
-20.40 
  
(-0.41) 
 
(-0.89) 
 
(-2.03) 
 
(-4.25) 
 
(-2.85) 
logRGDP(-1) 0.55 
 
0.30 
 
0.41 
 
0.66 
 
0.65 
  
(5.29) 
 
(1.28) 
 
(3.37) 
 
(3.63) 
 
(2.15) 
logREX(-2) -0.19 
   
-0.15 
 
-0.26 
 
-0.20 
  
(-5.04) 
   
(-3.25) 
 
(-3.66) 
 
(-1.80) 
logSTDEV_REX(-2) 
  
0.07 
      
    
(0.81) 
      logFDIRGDP(-1) 0.37 
 
0.32 
 
0.43 
 
0.42 
 
-0.04 
  
(1.94) 
 
(2.07) 
 
(3.90) 
 
(3.44) 
 
(-0.12) 
logPROPRIGHT 0.11 
       
0.74 
  
(0.50) 
       
(3.26) 
logCORRPTFREE 
  
0.11 
      
    
(0.36) 
      logFISCFREE 
  
-0.22 
     
0.09 
    
(-0.39) 
     
(0.21) 
logGOVSPEND(-1) -2.46 
 
-0.73 
     
0.87 
  
(-2.11) 
 
(-1.01) 
     
(0.76) 
logBIZFREE 
      
1.19 
  
        
(3.71) 
  logLABRFREE 
    
0.30 
    
      
(0.22) 
    logMNTRFREE 
    
0.42 
    
      
(1.37) 
    logTRDFREE 
      
-0.94 
  
        
(-2.53) 
  logINVESTFREE 0.48 
     
0.46 
  
  
(2.13) 
     
(3.04) 
  logFINFREE 
    
0.50 
    
      
(0.91) 
    CONFLICT 
        
0.13 
          
(0.88) 
ECONSANC 
      
0.31 
  
        
(3.08) 
  AR(1) 
 
-0.15 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.21 
 
-0.28 
 
0.26 
  
(-0.88) 
 
(-0.54) 
 
(-1.90) 
 
(-3.73) 
 
(0.84) 
           AdjR
2 
 
0.71 
 
0.70 
 
0.71 
 
0.76 
 
0.69 
F-Statistic 
 
18.94 
 
18.03 
 
18.65 
 
23.11 
 
16.13 
D.W. 
 
2.01 
 
2.01 
 
2.03 
 
2.08 
 
1.97 
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6. Conclusion and application to Myanmar 
 
This study conducted an econometric analysis on panel data from Southeast Asian Countries 
for the period 1995-2011 with the aim to finding the significant determining factors of FDI 
inflows to those countries. Using a fixed-effects regression, the analysis considered factors 
ranging across economic indicators, scores in the ten components measured in the Index of 
Economic Freedom, and the presence of economic sanctions and armed conflict. Though there 
were a few exceptions, the results obtained were generally expected and can be explained 
theoretically.  
Overall, trends in the region are promising for economic growth in general and in growth of 
FDI inflows more specifically. Myanmar too has an opportunity to experience strong economic 
growth largely influenced by capital from abroad. However, to achieve this growth, Myanmar 
must first address a few issues that may very well override the recently enacted investment laws 
and therefore reducing the effectiveness of the results of this study. 
Certain obstacles, which either did not prove their relevance in this study or were not able to 
be included, must be addressed before Myanmar can achieve its potential. The presence of 
economic sanctions as well as risk induced by internal conflicts and natural disasters could 
render the implementation of the new investment law irrelevant. The presence, and history, of 
economic sanctions taints the picture that foreign firms see of a country and often restricts 
investment altogether. The latter resulting in a net loss for all potential parties involved. Firms 
cannot simply bypass the direct restriction of capital flows to countries under economic 
sanctions. The unexpected result of the economic sanction variable in this study is an unfortunate 
misrepresentation of the true detrimental effect of these political hindrances. Myanmar should 
still strive for the full removal of sanctions which is highly correlated with the presence of 
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ongoing armed conflicts in the country. The presence of which, and the ongoing negative 
attention it brings, is a significant burden to the progress that Myanmar has achieved in the last 
few years and could also hinder its attractiveness to investors going forward.  
Furthermore, the inherent risk from natural disasters should improve with time and 
development of the country’s infrastructure; however, this element of risk in the country cannot 
be directly affected by political reforms and will remain a factor of uncertainty for investors. 
Lastly, to put itself into a position where it can experience growth similar to the countries 
studied, Myanmar must address any areas in which they remain an outlier. For instance, the 
country’s 2012 score of just 0 for investment freedom represents the considerable difficulty in 
transferring capital resources in any capacity involving the country. In many cases, firms would 
be entirely unwilling to invest in the country without complete confidence in their control of 
their own capital. 
Under the assumption that those obstacles that can be addressed will receive the attention 
they require, such as the full removal of economic sanctions, Myanmar should then concentrate 
on those factors that appear to correspond most strongly to increased FDI inflows to other 
ASEAN countries. According to the findings above, the positive and statistically significant 
economic indicator variables are the lagged real GDP and the lagged real exchange rate. While 
Myanmar’s market is not particularly large, in fact it would be one of the smaller markets in this 
dataset by real GDP, a large population and therefore a large potential labor force and consumer 
base would likely drive the country’s GDP significantly higher in the next few years. In this case, 
speculation on future growth may prove to be of greater importance to MNEs rather than the 
market size in the previous period. However, the rationale still applies that market size is an 
important factor in determining FDI inflows.  
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With respect to Myanmar’s real exchange rate, the country’s recent move away from a fixed 
rate has resulted in a significant depreciation, which according to the results found in this study, 
should have a negative effect on FDI inflows. Furthermore, with the switch to the market float, 
the rate lost considerable stability. While the fluctuation in the real exchange rate was not found 
to be statistically significant in this study, theory still suggests that a stable exchange rate is 
relevant to a MNE’s decision to invest.   
Additionally, many economic freedom variables were found to be statistically significant, 
including: Property Rights, Government Spending, Business Freedom, Trade Freedom and 
Investment Freedom. The statistical significance of many of the economic freedom components 
confirm this study’s hypothesis that these index-based variables contain strong explanative 
power and can be stronger indicators than either investment policies or institutional factors alone. 
Furthermore, the significance of these components suggests that it is the overall investment 
climate which attracts MNEs. With respect to these variables, Myanmar should concentrate its 
resources toward its enforcement of property right. Its current score of only 10 is far below 43, 
the average score of the countries in this study over the time period. Myanmar’s next area of 
concentration should be with respect to government spending. Myanmar’s 2012 score of 96.8 is 
only slightly higher than the sample’s average of 87.8. While the Heritage Foundation suggests 
this score is very good, and that government spending is only 10.4% of GDP, the military’s 
decreasing role in government should allow for the country’s military expenditure to fall and 
expenditure towards other, more productive areas such as education and infrastructure to rise. An 
area that requires drastic improvement to attract FDI inflows is the business freedom within the 
country. Myanmar’s 2012 score of only 20 is far below the sample’s average of 62. Though its 
recent implementation of the Foreign Investment Law and corresponding rules should drastically 
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improve the regulatory environment, efficient application of the policy may take a few more 
years. Lastly, the improvement of its investment freedom score is vital to attracting FDI inflows. 
Myanmar has been presented with an opportunity that could propel strong economic growth 
forward.  Before this can be achieved, Myanmar must address two important factors. Firstly, it 
must overcome the substantial obstacles mentioned above that will keep it from this growth until 
they are addressed. With the hope that it can overcome these obstacles, as it has overcome 
numerous other challenges in the last few years, Myanmar should have the ability to improve 
upon these significant factors. Secondly, the rationale behind the inclusion of the freedom 
variables applies to Myanmar’s approach to its policies more generally. Now that the 
government has successfully designed investment laws that should attract FDI inflows, it must 
enforce these laws consistently and transparently otherwise their existence will be irrelevant.  
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7. Data Tables and Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4: Cambodia Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev. Obs. 
FDIRGDP 5.78 6.03 10.04 1.80 2.23 98.28 79.62 17 
RGDP 
507000
0000.00 
45700000
00.00 
845000000
0.00 
25700000
00.00 
201000000
0.00 
861000000
00.00 
64400000000000
000000.00 17 
REX 3995.04 3904.60 5531.21 1996.98 1042.48 67915.71 17388151.00 17 
STDEV_REX 
827023.
90 
348286.6
0 6843885.00 17977.17 
1660396.0
0 
14059406.0
0 
44100000000000.
00 17 
BIZFREE 50.39 55.00 55.00 39.50 6.51 856.60 678.24 17 
FINFREE 54.71 50.00 70.00 50.00 8.74 930.00 1223.53 17 
FISCFREE 91.42 91.40 91.70 90.90 0.23 1554.20 0.87 17 
CORRPTFREE 26.00 30.00 30.00 10.00 6.13 442.00 602.00 17 
GOVSPEND 92.33 91.80 94.50 90.40 1.31 1569.60 27.28 17 
INVESTFREE 51.18 50.00 60.00 50.00 3.32 870.00 176.47 17 
LABRFREE 44.24 43.90 46.30 43.60 0.80 752.10 10.24 17 
TRDFREE 53.65 62.80 70.00 15.00 19.70 912.00 6206.52 17 
PROPRIGHT 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 0.00 510.00 0.00 17 
MNTRFREE 75.38 78.00 87.00 62.10 8.38 1281.40 1124.39 17 
CONFLICT 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.47 5.00 3.53 17 
ECONSANC 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.33 15.00 1.76 17 
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Table 5: Indonesia Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev. Obs. 
FDIRGDP 0.83 1.35 2.92 -2.76 1.66 14.09 43.99 17 
RGDP 
203000000
000.00 
187000000
000.00 
292000000
000.00 
156000000
000.00 
437000000
00.00 
3460000
000000.0
0 
30500000000
00000000000
0.00 17 
REX 7733.39 8087.38 13097.62 813.54 3877.84 
131467.7
0 241000000.00 17 
STDEV_REX 9922538.00 7470425.00 
50704214.0
0 214935.80 
11910294.0
0 
1690000
00.00 
22700000000
00000.00 17 
BIZFREE 53.15 55.00 55.00 46.60 3.22 903.60 166.12 17 
FINFREE 37.65 40.00 50.00 30.00 8.31 640.00 1105.88 17 
FISCFREE 78.81 79.40 83.00 73.10 2.26 1339.80 81.64 17 
CORRPTFREE 20.41 20.00 28.00 10.00 5.28 347.00 446.12 17 
GOVSPEND 88.59 89.10 95.40 76.50 4.13 1506.10 272.45 17 
INVESTFREE 47.06 50.00 70.00 30.00 17.14 800.00 4702.94 17 
LABRFREE 50.90 50.94 52.78 49.10 0.73 865.22 8.60 17 
TRDFREE 71.68 73.00 77.90 45.00 7.49 1218.50 898.43 17 
PROPRIGHT 37.06 30.00 50.00 30.00 9.85 630.00 1552.94 17 
MNTRFREE 69.45 71.30 74.60 49.40 6.60 1180.60 696.24 17 
CONFLICT 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.51 9.00 4.24 17 
ECONSANC 0.41 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.51 7.00 4.12 17 
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Table 6: Laos Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev. Obs. 
FDIRGDP 3.67 3.62 8.53 0.25 2.42 62.44 93.85 17 
RGDP 
22300000
00.00 
20600000
00.00 
37200000
00.00 
12800000
00.00 
75300000
0.00 
37900000
000.00 
907000000000
0000000.00 17 
REX 6709.63 9317.36 10655.17 80.42 4080.52 114063.80 266000000.00 17 
STDEV_REX 
7557617.0
0 
3378546.0
0 
31809890.
00 238631.40 
8362837.0
0 
12800000
0.00 
112000000000
0000.00 17 
BIZFREE 45.98 40.00 60.80 40.00 8.67 781.70 1203.91 17 
FINFREE 14.12 10.00 30.00 10.00 6.18 240.00 611.76 17 
FISCFREE 60.32 70.60 80.10 32.20 18.92 1025.40 5724.61 17 
CORRPTFREE 14.00 10.00 33.00 10.00 7.04 238.00 794.00 17 
GOVSPEND 88.29 89.70 92.80 81.30 3.29 1501.00 173.19 17 
INVESTFREE 20.00 25.00 30.00 10.00 9.84 340.00 1550.00 17 
LABRFREE 60.88 61.30 63.50 49.90 3.01 1035.00 144.88 17 
TRDFREE 64.06 66.00 81.00 55.60 7.95 1089.00 1011.66 17 
PROPRIGHT 10.88 10.00 20.00 10.00 2.64 185.00 111.76 17 
MNTRFREE 57.88 62.80 80.40 13.80 17.45 984.00 4869.95 17 
CONFLICT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 
ECONSANC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 
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Table 7: Malaysia Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev. Obs. 
FDIRGDP 3.52 3.71 5.13 0.06 1.48 59.91 35.06 17 
RGDP 
11000000
0000.00 
10500000
0000.00 
15400000
0000.00 
74200000
000.00 
25400000
000.00 
18700000
00000.00 
1030000000000
0000000000.00 17 
REX 3.52 3.68 4.13 2.52 0.50 59.81 4.03 17 
STDEV_REX 
10206148.
00 
8875556.0
0 
30073545.
00 
1201321.0
0 
8320767.0
0 
17400000
0.00 
1110000000000
000.00 17 
BIZFREE 75.05 70.00 85.00 67.60 7.60 1275.90 924.90 17 
FINFREE 41.18 40.00 50.00 30.00 9.28 700.00 1376.47 17 
FISCFREE 80.33 80.90 84.60 74.10 2.88 1365.60 132.30 17 
CORRPTFREE 52.76 51.00 70.00 45.00 6.78 897.00 735.06 17 
GOVSPEND 80.86 81.30 85.50 74.20 3.57 1374.60 203.82 17 
INVESTFREE 39.71 40.00 70.00 30.00 11.52 675.00 2123.53 17 
LABRFREE 71.23 70.23 79.20 68.47 2.28 1210.97 83.08 17 
TRDFREE 71.47 73.00 78.70 55.00 6.45 1215.00 666.14 17 
PROPRIGHT 57.35 50.00 70.00 50.00 9.70 975.00 1505.88 17 
MNTRFREE 79.83 79.90 82.80 76.60 2.10 1357.10 70.50 17 
CONFLICT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 
ECONSANC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 
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Table 8: Philippines Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev. Obs. 
FDIRGDP 1.55 1.61 3.17 0.26 0.80 26.32 10.14 17 
RGDP 
95900000
000.00 
90700000
000.00 
13400000
0000.00 
68000000
000.00 
21100000
000.00 
16300000
00000.00 
7120000000000
000000000.00 17 
REX 43.29 47.94 55.09 19.52 11.90 735.96 2264.89 17 
STDEV_REX 
10027073.
00 
8686373.0
0 
29710956.
00 
1134281.0
0 
8217794.0
0 
17000000
0.00 
1080000000000
000.00 17 
BIZFREE 55.07 55.00 70.00 43.40 6.48 936.20 671.96 17 
FINFREE 48.82 50.00 50.00 30.00 4.85 830.00 376.47 17 
FISCFREE 75.82 75.90 78.80 73.00 2.11 1288.90 71.20 17 
CORRPTFREE 26.53 26.00 36.00 10.00 5.46 451.00 476.24 17 
GOVSPEND 89.29 88.90 91.20 87.90 1.09 1517.90 19.16 17 
INVESTFREE 43.53 50.00 50.00 30.00 8.62 740.00 1188.24 17 
LABRFREE 54.81 54.55 59.17 50.70 2.61 931.75 109.06 17 
TRDFREE 68.86 77.00 79.80 42.00 12.55 1170.60 2520.22 17 
PROPRIGHT 46.47 50.00 70.00 30.00 17.66 790.00 4988.24 17 
MNTRFREE 76.12 76.70 79.30 72.70 1.90 1294.00 57.86 17 
CONFLICT 1.06 1.00 2.00 1.00 0.24 18.00 0.94 17 
ECONSANC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 
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Table 9: Singapore Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev. Obs. 
FDIRGDP 16.28 14.65 27.86 7.07 6.72 276.76 721.59 17 
RGDP 
114000000
000.00 
103000000
000.00 
174000000
000.00 
725000000
00.00 
316000000
00.00 
194000000
0000.00 
160000000000
00000000000.0
0 17 
REX 1.67 1.68 1.93 1.31 0.21 28.40 0.69 17 
STDEV_REX 
10214198.
00 
8884043.0
0 
30087659.
00 
1203942.0
0 
8324564.0
0 
174000000
.00 
111000000000
0000.00 17 
BIZFREE 99.18 100.00 100.00 96.70 1.21 1686.10 23.34 17 
FINFREE 63.53 70.00 70.00 50.00 8.62 1080.00 1188.24 17 
FISCFREE 86.05 87.80 91.10 80.60 4.05 1462.80 262.52 17 
CORRPTFREE 91.65 92.00 94.00 87.00 2.03 1558.00 65.88 17 
GOVSPEND 91.68 91.30 95.30 88.10 2.03 1558.50 65.93 17 
INVESTFREE 86.47 90.00 90.00 75.00 5.80 1470.00 538.24 17 
LABRFREE 89.91 93.08 98.90 72.62 9.19 1528.48 1352.66 17 
TRDFREE 85.53 85.00 90.00 83.00 3.08 1454.00 152.24 17 
PROPRIGHT 90.00 90.00 90.00 90.00 0.00 1530.00 0.00 17 
MNTRFREE 87.92 88.00 93.00 80.90 3.14 1494.70 157.51 17 
CONFLICT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 
ECONSANC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 
 
 
 
 
  
 95 
Table 10: Thailand Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev. Obs. 
FDIRGDP 3.38 3.13 6.54 1.23 1.43 57.47 32.56 17 
RGDP 
147000000
000.00 
141000000
000.00 
188000000
000.00 
112000000
000.00 
264000000
00.00 
250000000
0000.00 
112000000000
00000000000.0
0 17 
REX 36.26 38.40 44.50 23.20 6.25 616.41 625.69 17 
STDEV_REX 
10069041.
00 
8713085.0
0 
29851951.
00 
1154189.0
0 
8266985.0
0 
171000000
.00 
109000000000
0000.00 17 
BIZFREE 70.63 70.00 73.80 69.90 1.21 1200.70 23.26 17 
FINFREE 52.94 50.00 70.00 50.00 6.86 900.00 752.94 17 
FISCFREE 74.84 74.80 75.50 74.20 0.41 1272.30 2.72 17 
CORRPTFREE 37.35 33.00 70.00 28.00 12.51 635.00 2505.88 17 
GOVSPEND 91.02 91.10 93.10 88.00 1.22 1547.30 23.74 17 
INVESTFREE 48.82 50.00 70.00 30.00 16.16 830.00 4176.47 17 
LABRFREE 71.52 73.60 77.70 61.08 5.53 1215.86 488.95 17 
TRDFREE 71.40 71.60 77.80 64.80 4.60 1213.80 338.78 17 
PROPRIGHT 63.53 70.00 90.00 45.00 16.08 1080.00 4138.24 17 
MNTRFREE 77.19 76.40 88.90 66.40 7.00 1312.30 783.21 17 
CONFLICT 0.53 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.51 9.00 4.24 17 
ECONSANC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 
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Table 11: Vietnam Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean  Median Max Min  Std. Dev.  Sum  Sum Sq. Dev. Obs. 
FDIRGDP 6.23 6.01 10.52 3.54 2.45 105.91 96.25 17 
RGDP 
41200000
000.00 
38300000
000.00 
66500000
000.00 
22300000
000.00 
14200000
000.00 
70000000
0000.00 
3220000000000
000000000.00 17 
REX 16616.24 14110.95 35264.14 9489.47 6872.61 282476.10 756000000.00 17 
STDEV_REX 
92283570.
00 
49656455.
00 
37800000
0.00 
31490483.
00 
93095532.
00 
15700000
00.00 
1390000000000
00000.00 17 
BIZFREE 47.29 40.00 61.70 40.00 10.19 804.00 1661.79 17 
FINFREE 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 0.00 510.00 0.00 17 
FISCFREE 62.62 63.40 76.10 42.80 12.53 1064.50 2513.27 17 
CORRPTFREE 22.12 26.00 28.00 10.00 7.00 376.00 783.76 17 
GOVSPEND 80.71 79.10 90.30 73.40 4.65 1372.10 346.00 17 
INVESTFREE 28.53 30.00 30.00 15.00 4.24 485.00 288.24 17 
LABRFREE 65.35 64.10 70.00 64.10 1.98 1110.90 62.68 17 
TRDFREE 54.06 51.00 68.90 44.60 7.88 919.00 992.84 17 
PROPRIGHT 10.59 10.00 15.00 10.00 1.66 180.00 44.12 17 
MNTRFREE 70.39 69.30 86.50 55.20 8.64 1196.60 1194.60 17 
CONFLICT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17 
ECONSANC 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.44 4.00 3.06 17 
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix 
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8. Appendices 
Appendix A: Myanmar Climate Risk Map 
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Appendix B: Index of Economic Freedom Methodology 
 Criteria  Methodology / Measures 
Rule of law    
Property 
Rights 
 Ability of individuals 
to accumulate 
property 
 Degree of protection 
by laws and to which 
the government 
enforces them 
 Likelihood that 
property will be 
expropriated, 
independence of and 
corruption within the 
judiciary, ability of 
individuals and 
businesses to enforce 
contracts 
 Qualitative scaling based on specific criteria 
 Each country is graded according to the 
following criteria: 
 
 100—Private property is guaranteed by the 
government. The court system enforces 
contracts efficiently and quickly. The justice 
system punishes those who unlawfully 
confiscate private property. There is no 
corruption or expropriation. 
 90—Private property is guaranteed by the 
government. The court system enforces 
contracts efficiently. The justice system 
punishes those who unlawfully confiscate 
private property. Corruption is nearly 
nonexistent, and expropriation is highly 
unlikely. 
 80—Private property is guaranteed by the 
government. The court system enforces 
contracts efficiently but with some delays. 
Corruption is minimal, and expropriation is 
highly unlikely. 
 70—Private property is guaranteed by the 
government. The court system is subject to 
delays and is lax in enforcing contracts. 
Corruption is possible but rare, and 
expropriation is unlikely. 
 60—Enforcement of property rights is lax and 
subject to delays. Corruption is possible but 
rare, and the judiciary may be influenced by 
other branches of government. Expropriation is 
unlikely. 
 50—The court system is inefficient and subject 
to delays. Corruption may be present, and the 
judiciary may be influenced by other branches 
of government. Expropriation is possible but 
rare. 
 40—The court system is highly inefficient, and 
delays are so long that they deter the use of the 
court system. Corruption is present, and the 
judiciary is influenced by other branches of 
government. Expropriation is possible. 
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 30—Property ownership is weakly protected. 
The court system is highly inefficient. 
Corruption is extensive, and the judiciary is 
strongly influenced by other branches of 
government. Expropriation is possible. 
 20—Private property is weakly protected. The 
court system is so inefficient and corrupt that 
outside settlement and arbitration is the norm. 
Property rights are difficult to enforce. Judicial 
corruption is extensive. Expropriation is 
common. 
 10—Private property is rarely protected, and 
almost all property belongs to the state. The 
country is in such chaos (for example, because 
of ongoing war) that protection of property is 
almost impossible to enforce. The judiciary is 
so corrupt that property is not protected 
effectively. Expropriation is common. 
 0—Private property is outlawed, and all 
property belongs to the state. People do not 
have the right to sue others and do not have 
access to the courts. Corruption is endemic. 
Freedom 
from 
corruption 
 The score is derived 
from Transparency 
International’s 
Corruption 
Perceptions Index 
(CPI) two years prior 
to the Freedom Index, 
which measures the 
level of corruption in 
183 countries. 
 Qualitative scaling based on specific criteria 
 The CPI is based on a 10-point scale in which a 
score of 10 indicates very little corruption and 
a score of 0 indicates a very corrupt 
government. In scoring freedom from 
corruption, the Index converts the raw CPI data 
to a scale of 0 to 100 by multiplying the CPI 
score by 10. 
Limited 
Government 
  
Fiscal 
Freedom 
 Measures the tax 
burden imposed by a 
government 
 Quantitative grading based on: 
 The top marginal tax rate on individual 
income, 
 The top marginal tax rate on corporate 
income, and 
 The total tax burden as a percentage of GDP. 
 Fiscal freedom scores are calculated with a 
quadratic cost function to reflect the 
diminishing revenue returns from very high 
rates of taxation. The data for each factor are 
converted to a 100-point scale using the 
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following equation: 
 
Fiscal Freedomij= 100 – α (Factorij)2 
 
 where Fiscal Freedomij represents the fiscal 
freedom in country i for factor j; Factorij 
represents the value (based on a scale of 0 to 
100) in country i for factor j; and α is a 
coefficient set equal to 0.03. 
Government 
Spending 
 Level of government 
expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP 
 The expenditure equation used is: 
 
GEi = 100 – α (Expendituresi)2 
 
 where GEi represents the government 
expenditure score in country i; Expendituresi 
represents the total amount of government 
spending at all levels as a portion of GDP 
(between 0 and 100); and α is a coefficient to 
control for variation among scores (set at 0.03). 
The minimum component score is zero. 
Regulatory 
efficiency 
  
Business 
Freedom 
 Efficiency of 
government 
regulation of business 
 Criteria include: 
 Starting a business—
procedures (number); 
 Starting a business—
time (days); 
 Starting a business—
cost (% of income per 
capita); 
 Starting a business—
minimum capital (% 
of income per capita); 
 Obtaining a license—
procedures 
(number);2 
 Obtaining a license—
time (days); 
 Obtaining a license—
cost (% of income per 
capita); 
 Closing a business—
 Each factor based on the World Bank’s Doing 
Business study 
 Each of these raw factors is converted to a scale 
of 0 to 100, after which the average of the 
converted values is computed. The result 
represents the country’s business freedom 
score. For example, even if a country requires 
the highest number of procedures for starting a 
business, which yields a score of zero in that 
factor, it could still receive a score as high as 90 
based on scores in the other nine factors. 
 
 Each factor is converted to a scale of 0 to 100 
using the following equation: 
 
 Factor Scorei = 50 factoraverage/factori 
 
 which is based on the ratio of the country data 
for each factor relative to the world average, 
multiplied by 50. For example, on average 
worldwide, it takes 18 procedures to get 
necessary licenses.  
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time (years); 
 Closing a business—
cost (% of estate);  
 Closing a business—
recovery rate (cents 
on the dollar).3 
Labor 
Freedom 
 considers various 
aspects of the legal 
and regulatory 
framework of a 
country’s labor 
market 
 Six quantitative 
factors are equally 
weighted: 
 Ratio of minimum 
wage to the average 
value added per 
worker, 
 Hindrance to hiring 
additional workers, 
 Rigidity of hours, 
 Difficulty of firing 
redundant employees, 
 Legally mandated 
notice period, and 
 Mandatory severance 
pay. 
 In constructing the labor freedom score, each 
of the six factors is converted to a scale of 0 to 
100 based on the following equation: 
 
 Factor Scorei= 50 × factoraverage/factori 
 
 where country i data are calculated relative to 
the world average and then multiplied by 50. 
The six factor scores are then averaged for each 
country, yielding a labor freedom score. 
Monetary 
Freedom 
 Assesses price 
stability and price 
controls. 
 Specific factors 
include: 
 
 The weighted average 
inflation rate for the 
most recent three 
years and 
 Price controls. 
 The weighted average inflation rate for the 
most recent three years serves as the primary 
input into an equation that generates the base 
score for monetary freedom. The extent of 
price controls is then assessed as a penalty of 
up to 20 points subtracted from the base score. 
The two equations used to convert inflation 
rates into the monetary freedom score are: 
 
 Weighted Avg. Inflationi= θ1Inflationit + 
θ2Inflationit–1 + θ3Inflationit–2 
 
 Monetary Freedomi= 100 – α √Weighted Avg. 
Inflationi – PC penaltyi 
 
 where θ1 through θ3 (thetas 1–3) represent 
three numbers that sum to 1 and are 
 105 
exponentially smaller in sequence (in this case, 
values of 0.665, 0.245, and 0.090, respectively); 
Inflationit is the absolute value of the annual 
inflation rate in country i during year t as 
measured by the consumer price index; α 
represents a coefficient that stabilizes the 
variance of scores; and the price control (PC) 
penalty is an assigned value of 0–20 points 
based on the extent of price controls. 
 
 The convex (square root) functional form was 
chosen to create separation among countries 
with low inflation rates. A concave functional 
form would essentially treat all hyperinflations 
as equally bad, whether they were 100 percent 
price increases annually or 100,000 percent, 
whereas the square root provides much more 
gradation. The α coefficient is set to equal 
6.333, which converts a 10 percent inflation 
rate into a freedom score of 80.0 and a 2 
percent inflation rate into a score of 91.0. 
Open 
Markets 
  
Trade 
Freedom 
 A composite measure 
of the absence of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers 
that affect imports and 
exports of goods and 
services. The trade 
freedom score is 
based on two inputs: 
 
 The trade-weighted 
average tariff rate  
 Non-tariff barriers 
(NTBs). 
 Different imports entering a country can, and 
often do, face different tariffs. The weighted 
average tariff uses weights for each tariff based 
on the share of imports for each good. 
Weighted average tariffs are a purely 
quantitative measure and account for the basic 
calculation of the score using the following 
equation: 
 
 Trade Freedomi= (((Tariffmax–Tariffi ) 
/(Tariffmax–Tariffmin )) * 100) – NTBi 
 
 where Trade Freedomi represents the trade 
freedom in country i; Tariffmax and Tariffmin 
represent the upper and lower bounds for tariff 
rates (%); and Tariffi represents the weighted 
average tariff rate (%) in country i. The 
minimum tariff is naturally zero percent, and 
the upper bound was set as 50 percent. An NTB 
penalty is then subtracted from the base score. 
The penalty of 5, 10, 15, or 20 points is 
assigned according to the following scale: 
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 20—NTBs are used extensively across many 
goods and services and/or act to effectively 
impede a significant amount of international 
trade. 
 15—NTBs are widespread across many goods 
and services and/or act to impede a majority of 
potential international trade. 
 10—NTBs are used to protect certain goods 
and services and impede some international 
trade. 
 5—NTBs are uncommon, protecting few goods 
and services, and/or have very limited impact 
on international trade. 
 0—NTBs are not used to limit international 
trade. 
 We determine the extent of NTBs in a country’s 
trade policy regime using both qualitative and 
quantitative information. Restrictive rules that 
hinder trade vary widely, and their overlapping 
and shifting nature makes their complexity 
difficult to gauge. The categories of NTBs 
considered in our penalty include: 
 
 Quantity restrictions—import quotas; export 
limitations; voluntary export restraints; 
import–export embargoes and bans; 
countertrade, etc. 
 Price restrictions—antidumping duties; 
countervailing duties; border tax adjustments; 
variable levies/tariff rate quotas. 
 Regulatory restrictions—licensing; domestic 
content and mixing requirements; sanitary and 
phytosanitary standards (SPSs); safety and 
industrial standards regulations; packaging, 
labeling, and trademark regulations; 
advertising and media regulations. 
 Investment restrictions—exchange and other 
financial controls. 
 Customs restrictions—advance deposit 
requirements; customs valuation procedures; 
customs classification procedures; customs 
clearance procedures. 
 Direct government intervention—subsidies 
and other aid; government industrial policy 
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and regional development measures; 
government-financed research and other 
technology policies; national taxes and social 
insurance; competition policies; immigration 
policies; government procurement policies; 
state trading, government monopolies, and 
exclusive franchises. 
 As an example, Botswana received a trade 
freedom score of 79.7. By itself, Botswana’s 
weighted average tariff of 5.2 percent would 
have yielded a score of 89.7, but the existence 
of NTBs in Botswana reduced the score by 10 
points. 
 
 Gathering tariff statistics to make a consistent 
cross-country comparison is a challenging task. 
Unlike data on inflation, for instance, countries 
do not report their weighted average tariff rate 
or simple average tariff rate every year; in 
some cases, the most recent year for which a 
country reported its tariff data could be as far 
back as 2002. To preserve consistency in 
grading the trade policy component, the Index 
uses the most recently reported weighted 
average tariff rate for a country from our 
primary source. If another reliable source 
reports more updated information on the 
country’s tariff rate, this fact is noted, and the 
grading of this component may be reviewed if 
there is strong evidence that the most recently 
reported weighted average tariff rate is 
outdated. 
 
 The World Bank publishes the most 
comprehensive and consistent information on 
weighted average applied tariff rates. When the 
weighted average applied tariff rate is not 
available, the Index uses the country’s average 
applied tariff rate; and when the country’s 
average applied tariff rate is not available, the 
weighted average or the simple average of 
most favored nation (MFN) tariff rates is used.8 
In the very few cases where data on duties and 
customs revenues are not available, data on 
international trade taxes or an estimated 
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effective tariff rate are used instead. In all 
cases, an effort is made to clarify the type of 
data used and the different sources for those 
data in the corresponding write-up for the 
trade policy component. 
Investment 
Freedom 
 In an economically 
free country, there 
would be no 
constraints on the 
flow of investment 
capital. Individuals 
and firms would be 
allowed to move their 
resources into and out 
of specific activities, 
both internally and 
across the country’s 
borders, without 
restriction. Such an 
ideal country would 
receive a score of 100 
on the investment 
freedom component of 
the Index of Economic 
Freedom. 
 
 In practice, most 
countries have a 
variety of restrictions 
on investment. Some 
have different rules 
for foreign and 
domestic investment; 
some restrict access to 
foreign exchange; 
some impose 
restrictions on 
payments, transfers, 
and capital 
transactions; in some, 
certain industries are 
closed to foreign 
investment. Labor 
regulations, 
corruption, red tape, 
 The Index evaluates a variety of restrictions 
that are typically imposed on investment. 
Points, as indicated below, are deducted from 
the ideal score of 100 for each of the 
restrictions found in a country’s investment 
regime. It is not necessary for a government to 
impose all of the listed restrictions at the 
maximum level to effectively eliminate 
investment freedom. Those few governments 
that impose so many restrictions that they total 
more than 100 points in deductions have had 
their scores set at zero. 
 
 Investment restrictions: 
 
 National treatment of foreign investment 
 
 No national treatment, prescreening 25 points 
deducted 
 Some national treatment, some prescreening
 15 points deducted 
 Some national treatment or prescreening 5 
points deducted 
 Foreign investment code 
 
 No transparency and burdensome bureaucracy 
20 points deducted 
 Inefficient policy implementation and 
bureaucracy 10 points deducted 
 Some investment laws and practices non-
transparent or inefficiently implemented 5 
points deducted 
 Restrictions on land ownership 
 
 All real estate purchases restricted 15 points 
deducted 
 No foreign purchases of real estate 10 points 
deducted 
 Some restrictions on purchases of real estate 5 
points deducted 
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weak infrastructure, 
and political and 
security conditions 
can also affect the 
freedom that investors 
have in a market. 
 Sectoral investment restrictions 
 
 Multiple sectors restricted 20 points deducted 
 Few sectors restricted 10 points deducted 
 One or two sectors restricted 5 points 
deducted 
 Expropriation of investments without fair 
compensation 
 
 Common with no legal recourse 25 points 
deducted 
 Common with some legal recourse 15 points 
deducted 
 Uncommon but occurs 5 points deducted 
 Foreign exchange controls 
 No access by foreigners or residents 25 points 
deducted 
 Access available but heavily restricted 15 
points deducted 
 Access available with few restrictions 5 points 
deducted 
 Capital controls 
 No repatriation of profits; all transactions 
require government approval 25 points 
deducted 
 Inward and outward capital movements 
require approval and face some restrictions
 15 points deducted 
 Most transfers approved with some 
restrictions 5 points deducted 
 Up to an additional 20 points may be deducted 
for security problems, a lack of basic 
investment infrastructure, or other 
government policies that indirectly burden the 
investment process and limit investment 
freedom. 
Financial 
Freedom 
 Measures banking 
efficiency as well as 
independence from 
government control 
and interference in the 
financial sector. State 
ownership of banks 
and other financial 
institutions such as 
 These five areas are considered to assess an 
economy’s overall level of financial freedom 
that ensures easy and effective access to 
financing opportunities for people and 
businesses in the economy. An overall score on 
a scale of 0 to 100 is given to an economy’s 
financial freedom through deductions from the 
ideal score of 100. 
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insurers and capital 
markets reduces 
competition and 
generally lowers the 
level of available 
services. 
 The Index scores an 
economy’s financial 
freedom by looking 
into the following five 
broad areas: 
 
 The extent of 
government 
regulation of financial 
services, 
 The degree of state 
intervention in banks 
and other financial 
firms through direct 
and indirect 
ownership, 
 The extent of financial 
and capital market 
development, 
 Government influence 
on the allocation of 
credit, and 
 Openness to foreign 
competition. 
 100—Negligible government interference. 
 90—Minimal government interference. 
Regulation of financial institutions is minimal 
but may extend beyond enforcing contractual 
obligations and preventing fraud. 
 80—Nominal government interference. 
Government ownership of financial institutions 
is a small share of overall sector assets. 
Financial institutions face almost no 
restrictions on their ability to offer financial 
services. 
 70—Limited government interference. Credit 
allocation is influenced by the government, and 
private allocation of credit faces almost no 
restrictions. Government ownership of 
financial institutions is sizeable. Foreign 
financial institutions are subject to few 
restrictions. 
 60—Significant government interference. The 
central bank is not fully independent, its 
supervision and regulation of financial 
institutions are somewhat burdensome, and its 
ability to enforce contracts and prevent fraud is 
insufficient. The government exercises active 
ownership and control of financial institutions 
with a significant share of overall sector assets. 
The ability of financial institutions to offer 
financial services is subject to some 
restrictions. 
 50—Considerable government interference. 
Credit allocation is significantly influenced by 
the government, and private allocation of credit 
faces significant barriers. The ability of 
financial institutions to offer financial services 
is subject to significant restrictions. Foreign 
financial institutions are subject to some 
restrictions. 
 40—Strong government interference. The 
central bank is subject to government 
influence, its supervision of financial 
institutions is heavy-handed, and its ability to 
enforce contracts and prevent fraud is weak. 
The government exercises active ownership 
and control of financial institutions with a large 
minority share of overall sector assets. 
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 30—Extensive government interference. Credit 
allocation is extensively influenced by the 
government. The government owns or controls 
a majority of financial institutions or is in a 
dominant position. Financial institutions are 
heavily restricted, and bank formation faces 
significant barriers. Foreign financial 
institutions are subject to significant 
restrictions. 
 20—Heavy government interference. The 
central bank is not independent, and its 
supervision of financial institutions is 
repressive. Foreign financial institutions are 
discouraged or highly constrained. 
 10—Near repressive. Credit allocation is 
controlled by the government. Bank formation 
is restricted. Foreign financial institutions are 
prohibited. 
 0—Repressive. Supervision and regulation are 
designed to prevent private financial 
institutions. Private financial institutions are 
prohibited. 
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